http://www.peterleeson.com/An-arrgh-chy.pdfIt's about the laws and economics of pirates.
Some excerpts:
Several important features stand out from these examples of pirate
articles. First, they created a democratic form of governance and ex-
plicitly laid out the terms of pirate compensation. This was to clarify
the status of property rights aboard pirate ships and to prevent officers,
such as the captain or quartermaster, from preying on crew members.
In particular, making the terms of compensation explicit helped to cir-
cumscribe the quartermaster’s authority in dividing booty.
Third, pirate constitutions contained articles that provided incentives
for crew member productivity and prevented shirking. One manifes-
tation of this was their creation of social insurance for pirates injured
during battle. As in the examples from Exquemelin and Roberts above,
articles specified in detail what a lost arm was worth, a lost leg, and so
on. They even went as far as to assign different insurance values de-
pending on whether it was, for instance, the right or left appendage
that was mutilated or lost, according to the importance pirates assigned
to these body parts.
Another manifestation of these incentive provisions was the use of
bonuses for crew members who displayed particular courage in battle,
were the first to spot potential targets, and so forth. Because pirate crews
were large, quartermasters could not easily monitor individual pirates’
effort. As I discuss below, this is why pirates used profit sharing rather
than fixed wages for payment.
The problem with a share system is that it can create incentives for
free riding. Further, one team member’s laziness directly reduces the
income of the others. To deal with this, pirates, like privateers and
whalers, who also used a share system, created bonuses. According to
the rule aboard Exquemelin’s buccaneering vessel, for instance, “Those
who behaved courageously and performed any deed of extraordinary
valour, or captured a ship, should be rewarded out of the common
plunder” (1678, 156). Or, as Johnson records, “It must be observed,
they [pirates] keep a good Look-out; for, according to their Articles, he
who first espies a Sail, if she proves a Prize, is entitled the best Pair of
Pistols on board, over and above his Dividend” (1726–28, 191).
Finally, pirate articles stipulated punishments for failure to adhere to
their rules. As discussed above, for more minor infractions, crews typ-
ically delegated punishment power to the ship’s democratically elected
quartermaster. As Johnson described it, the quartermaster “acts as a Sort
of civil Magistrate on board a Pyrate Ship” (1726–28, 213).