



Bundesministerium
des Innern
und für Heimat

Brief summary 2023 Report on the Protection of the Constitution

Facts and Trends




GRUNDGESETZ
für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland

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Politically motivated crime ¹

In 2023, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) registered a total of 60,028 (2022: 58,916) politically motivated criminal offences. Of these, 19,905 (33.2%) were propaganda offences (2022: 16,340, 27.7%). Another 3,561 (5.9%) were categorised as politically motivated violent crime (2022: 4,043, 6.9%).

Of the total number of politically motivated offences, 39,433 (65.7%) were found to have an extremist background (2022: 35,452, 60.2%). This includes 2,761 extremist violent offences (2022: 2,847) and 5,183 (2022: 8,246) offences with an extremist background classified as “other”.

Key points:

- The number of criminal offences with a right-wing extremist background rose by 22.4% in the reporting period; the number of violent offences in this subset rose by 13%. This includes four attempted homicides.
- The extremist offences that were attributed to the group of “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” (literally, “citizens of the Reich” and “self-administrators”) decreased by 30.4% in the reporting period, while the number of violent offences as a proportion of these decreased by 21.2% in comparison to the previous year. This includes one attempted homicide.
- The number of offences with a left-wing extremist background rose by 10.4%; the number of violent offences in this subset increased by 20.8%. This includes three attempted homicides. The number of violent offences against the police/security authorities increased significantly in the reporting year (477 offences, +65.6%), which still makes these authorities the main target of left-wing extremist violence. The reporting year saw a particularly striking increase in

1 Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

the number of violent offences related to the purported “fight for the climate” (2022: 56, 2023: 293 violent offences +423.2%).

- The number of extremist criminal offences in the category of politically motivated crime – religious ideology more than tripled (2023: 1,250; 2022: 361; +246.3%). The number of violent offences in this category rose by 67.4%.
- The number of criminal and violent offences motivated by extremist foreign ideology rose significantly during the reporting period (+56.6%). The number of violent offences too increased again, by 45%. The increase in extremist criminal offences in this category stems mainly from a significant rise in the number of offences related to the Israel-Palestine context.
- In the reporting year, a significant rise in cases with an antisemitic background was recorded, in particular among those violent and criminal offences motivated by extremist foreign or religious ideology and to a smaller extent also those motivated by left-wing extremism. The overwhelming majority of these offences occurred in the period after 7 October 2023 and thus after the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel.

Specifically:

The number of offences categorised as **right-wing politically motivated crime** was 28,945 (2022: 23,493). Of these, 16,698 (2022: 14,132) were propaganda offences under sections 86 and 86a of the German Criminal Code (*Strafgesetzbuch*, StGB) and 1,270 (2022: 1,170) were violent offences. As a subset of this category, 25,660 offences with a right-wing extremist background were recorded (2022: 20,967), among them 1,148 violent offences (2022: 1,016). This represents an increase of approximately 13% in the number of violent offences compared with the previous year. This includes, in particular, four attempted homicides.

In 2023, the number of right-wing extremist offences motivated by xenophobia rose by 39% (10,402 offences, 2021: 7,484). The number of right-wing extremist offences motivated by antisemitism rose by 36.5% to 2,762 (2022: 2,023), while the number of violent crimes in this subset dropped by 18.9% to 43 (2022: 53).

In the reporting year, 1,292 politically motivated offences were attributed to “**Reichsbürger**” and “**Selbstverwalter**” (2022: 1,856), of which 1,070 were categorised as extremist (2022: 1,358). Of these, 149 were violent offences (2022: 286), including extortion (85) and resistance to law enforcement officers (49), as well as one attempted homicide. Coercion and threats also accounted for a considerable number of offences (425). Of the offences attributed to “**Reichsbürger**” and “**Selbstverwalter**”, 65 were found to be motivated by antisemitism; the majority of these (58) were crimes of incitement to hatred and violence.

The number of offences categorised as **left-wing politically motivated crime** was 7,777 (2022: 6,976), including 916 violent offences (2022: 842, +8.8%). As a subset of this category, 4,248 offences with a left-wing extremist background were recorded (2022: 3,847), including 727 violent offences (2022: 602). The number of left-wing extremist offences thus rose by 10.4%, and the number of violent offences in this subset rose by 20.8%.

Of the violent left-wing extremist violent offences, 481 were categorised as violent offences against the police/security authorities (2022: 292), an increase of nearly two-thirds. While the number of criminal offences against right-wing extremists or supposed right-wing extremists increased in this category (2023: 1,650, 2022: 1,576), the number of violent offences dropped to 204 (2022: 229, -10.9%). A significant increase of 423.2% was recorded in the number of violent offences related to the climate protest movement (2023: 293, 2022: 56). These were mainly cases of bodily harm (126 offences, 43%) and resistance to law enforcement officers (74 cases, 25.3%) In the reporting period, 36 antisemitic offences were classified as being motivated by left-wing extremism (2022: 5), including one violent offence. The vast majority of offences (32 criminal offences, including the violent offence) occurred in the period after 7 October 2023.

In 2023, 1,250 extremist offences were recorded in the category of **politically motivated crime – religious ideology** (2021: 418). Most of these offences (878; 2022: 361) had an Islamist extremist background. Of the 1,250 offences motivated by religious ideology, 72 were violent offences (2022: 43, an increase of 67.4%), including three attempted homicides and two homicides, as well as 42 cases of bodily harm. Forty-six extremist offences in the category of politically motivated crime – religious ideology were classified as preparation or support for a serious act of violence endangering state security (sections 89a to 89c and section 91 of the German Criminal Code), as opposed to 39 in 2022. Forty cases were counted as membership in or support for a foreign terrorist organisation (section 129b of the German Criminal Code), compared to 34 in 2021. In the reporting period, 492 antisemitic offences motivated by extremist religious ideology were recorded, including 22 violent offences and 167 crimes of incitement to hatred and violence. This is a substantial increase compared to the same period of the previous year (2022: 33 antisemitic offences, including two violent offences and 17 crimes of incitement to hatred and violence) and is mainly due to offences that were recorded after the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 (437 offences, including 19 violent offences and 146 crimes of incitement to hatred and violence).

The number of extremist offences categorised as **politically motivated crime – foreign ideology** was 3,092 (2022: 1,974), representing an increase of 56.6%. These offences were predominantly criminal damage (20.6%) but also included 329 violent offences (10.6%). After the already significant increase in the previous year, the number of violent offences rose again, by 45.6%. The vast majority of these were cases of bodily harm (66.6%), while 17% were cases of resistance to law enforcement officers.

Offences with a foreign extremist background again increased significantly. In 2023, there was a particularly dramatic increase in crimes motivated by antisemitism: the 1,044 offences were 18 times more than in the previous year (2022: 58). The violent offences in this category also soared, by more than 440%. Here too, the offences recorded after the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 (957 offences motivated by antisemitism in this period,

including 58 violent offences) constitute the vast majority of all offences in this area and were primarily responsible for the increase in those offences motivated by antisemitism.

Special chapter “Impact of the Middle East conflict and antisemitism²”

The HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 was a profound rupture in the security architecture of the Middle East, with consequences that also have direct implications for the security situation in Germany. After the attack, various extremist actors in Germany called for hatred and violence against Jewish people or the State of Israel, or denied Israel’s right to exist. This was directly evident in gatherings and demonstrations as well as in reactions on social media, and not least also in the increase in antisemitic incidents after 7 October 2023. Particularly in Germany’s major cities, antisemitic and anti-Israel criminal offences spiked in the days and weeks following the attack.

In multiple German cities, pro-Palestinian groups celebrated the HAMAS terrorist attack with spontaneous demonstrations; supporters of the Palestinian network Samidoun even distributed sweet pastries to celebrate the “victory of the resistance”. At demonstrations on 28 October 2023 in Hamburg and on 3 November 2023 in Essen (North Rhine-Westphalia), antisemitic speeches were delivered and antisemitic slogans were chanted. The demonstration in Hamburg had 500 participants, and the one in Essen had 3000 participants. The largest demonstrations during this period took place on 4 November 2023, when pro-Palestinian demonstrations were held in Düsseldorf (17,000 participants), Berlin (9,000 participants) and other German cities.

Those participating in these demonstrations included not only Islamist extremists and Palestinian extremists but also Turkish right-wing extremists as well as German and Turkish left-wing extremists; these different groups had highly divergent motivations for their mobilisation. What they all had in common, however, were antisemitism and hostility to Israel³.

- 2 Antisemitism is a complex and multi-layered concept, for which neither the research community nor policy makers have a single generally recognised definition. The Federal Government recommends the use of the following definition: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities. Furthermore, the State of Israel, being perceived as a Jewish collective, may be the target of such attacks.”
- 3 Hostility to Israel is considered anti-constitutional where it is directed against the concept of international understanding or is an expression of Israel-related antisemitism. Criticism of Israel which does not meet the aforementioned criteria is not considered anti-constitutional.

While supporters of HAMAS and Hezbollah had a limited public presence in the field of **Islamist extremism/terrorism**, other Islamist extremist groups exploited the current situation, especially to organise, to mobilise support and to take part in demonstrations, as well as to engage in agitation on social media. Elevated activity levels on social media were also evident among German and international jihadist groups. Regardless of their general stance towards HAMAS, al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) called for worldwide attacks against Jewish people and institutions as well as U.S. military infrastructure. Despite its ideological differences with HAMAS, al-Qaeda took a clearer and earlier public position on the events than IS did. Following initial hesitation, both the core IS organisation and its regional branches such as Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) issued calls for violence against Israel and Jews around the world.

The escalation in the Middle East was strongly echoed on social media. Islamist extremist organisations with close ideological ties to Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) had an especially strong presence on social media. These voices positioned a constructed totality of “the Muslims” or “the Palestinians” as victims of “the West” within a discourse of identity politics and promoted the establishment of Islamist extremist forms of society.

In the area of **foreign extremism**, the relevant extremist actors include not only extremist Palestinian individuals but also organisations and people from the milieu of the terrorist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and especially the network Samidoun, which was banned in Germany on 2 November 2023. Both of these organisations deny the right of Israel to exist and more or less openly promote taking up arms against Israel.

From the outset of the pro-Palestinian protests, the extremist network Samidoun and its members and sympathisers played a particularly prominent role in organising events, mobilising support and participating in events. On 2 November 2023, the Federal Minister of the Interior banned the activities in Germany of the international Samidoun network. The Federal Minister banned the sub-organisation Samidoun Deutschland, which also operates

under the names HIRAK – Palestinian Youth Mobilization Jugendbewegung (Germany) and Hirak e.V., and ordered it dissolved.

Turkish left-wing extremists, including the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) and organisations associated with it, as well as Young Struggle, the youth organisation of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP), also participated in the demonstrations and in agitation on social media. So too did Turkish right-wing extremists, especially non-organised supporters of the Ülkücü movement. However, the majority of participants in demonstrations related to the Middle East conflict were not extremists. On social media too, various extremist actors took up the developments in the Middle East, reinterpreted them to their own ideological ends and used them for propaganda purposes. This always entails a danger that previously moderate online communities will develop greater potential for radicalisation.

On social media, Turkish right-wing extremists spread not only criticism of the pro-Israel stance of the German government and the majority of the German public, but also antisemitism and racism. Hostility to Jewish people, denial of Israel's right to exist, and the spreading of antisemitic stereotypes and conspiracy narratives are core elements of the right-wing extremist ideology of the Turkish Ülkücü movement, and are widespread among Turkish right-wing extremists in Germany. This movement also espouses anti-Zionism, which is manifested in a one-sided partisanship for the concerns of the Palestinian people.

The Turkish left-wing extremist organisations active in Germany also regularly take clear positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, expressing solidarity both with the Palestinian people and explicitly with their extremist structures. They see these extremists as their allies in the "anti-imperialist struggle". Although antisemitism plays no ideological role in Turkish left-wing extremism, it is consistently present in their stated "anti-imperialist" and "anti-capitalist" world view. For this reason, Turkish left-wing extremist organisations such as the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) and Young

Struggle, the youth organisation of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP), take part in pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel demonstrations.

Regarding the HAMAS terrorist attack, **right-wing extremists** primarily speak of potential domestic policy impacts in Germany as a result of migration movements; specific developments in the Middle East are of relatively minor importance to them. Apart from scattered clear expressions of solidarity with the Palestinian people, for example by the party *Der III. Weg* (The Third Way) and some individual members of the party *Die Heimat* (Homeland; formerly the NPD), right-wing extremists – including *Die Heimat*’s national association – have remained largely indifferent to the Middle East conflict and have mainly disseminated statements expressing conspiracy theories and anti-immigrant sentiment.

Correspondingly, it was already evident directly after the first reports on the HAMAS attacks in October 2023 that overall developments in the Middle East as well as specific events were being interpreted through the lens of an antisemitic narrative claiming the existence of a “Jewish global conspiracy”. This narrative purports that the attacks and HAMAS itself are part of a Jewish plan to attain world domination or the annihilation of all “non-Jews”. This narrative was accompanied by a typical reversal of the roles of victim and perpetrator, blaming “the Jews” and ultimately Israel for antisemitism in the world and especially in the Middle East. Some individuals – especially those from the neo-Nazi spectrum – stood out for their explicit glorification of the HAMAS terrorist attack.

Antisemitism in its various forms has always been a central and constant characteristic of right-wing extremism. The demonisation of Jews, of people perceived as Jews, and of all things “Jewish” is thus an established fixture of right-wing extremism, which not least makes it possible to forge ties across different far-right scenes and create a sense of shared identity within right-wing extremism. Antisemitism can be seen in every sub-area of right-wing extremism, but with differing degrees of intensity. For example, antisemitism plays a central role in far-right political parties. In this context, antisemitism

is often communicated in coded form for strategic reasons and reasons of campaign tactics.

Among the Neue Rechte (New Right), by contrast, open antisemitism is not a basic ideological tenet. Unlike other right-wing extremists, the Neue Rechte did not make explicitly antisemitic statements in response to the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel and the subsequent new escalation of the Middle East conflict. However, some individuals associated with the Neue Rechte espouse conspiracy theories that imply antisemitism or at least tie in with antisemitic narratives, such as the notion of the “great replacement”. This refers to an alleged plan to “replace” white majority populations with Muslim and non-white immigrants. In this context, some right-wing extremists invoke a hostility to “elites” that is rooted in antisemitism or refer to the narrative of a “globalist” international conspiracy which is at least influenced by Jews.

Anti-Jewish attitudes and especially antisemitic conspiracy narratives offer right-wing extremists simple explanations for complex matters and for abstract political developments. For this reason, the notion of a secret Jewish global conspiracy is at the heart of many different narratives.

The left-wing extremist scene is divided on the Middle East conflict, with some **left-wing extremists** taking pro-Israel positions and others taking pro-Palestinian positions. Far-left autonomists largely expressed and affirmed pro-Israel positions, while almost all of the anti-imperialist violence-oriented left-wing extremists and strictly ideological left-wing extremists who together make up the majority of left-wing extremists expressed pro-Palestinian positions. In the weeks after 7 October 2023, both sides called on their supporters to participate in demonstrations and protests. The number of purely left-wing extremist demonstrations, however, was small. Rather, left-wing extremists took part in gatherings organised by foreign extremists or by groups belonging to the democratic spectrum.

In relation to the Middle East conflict, left-wing extremists also acted against law enforcement and against the authorities responsible for allowing public

gatherings, and criticised these authorities' actions – especially their requirements and the prohibition of certain events – as impermissible state repression and as discrimination against Palestinians and Muslims. Both before and after the banning of the extremist network Samidoun on 2 November 2023, left-wing extremist organisations issued numerous expressions of solidarity and calls to revoke the ban. This shows that various connections exist between German left-wing extremists from the anti-imperialist and strictly ideological scenes and Turkish left-wing extremists and secular extremist Palestinians.

Open antisemitism is largely absent from the left-wing extremist scene, as it goes against the political identity of left-wing extremism. The situation is different, however, regarding attitudes towards the State of Israel and its government. Anti-Israel and anti-Zionist positions are a long-standing formative influence for the larger part of the left-wing extremist scene, which is mostly strictly ideological. Such views are based primarily on an anti-imperialist world view. Among these left-wing extremists, Israeli policies are frequently described using terms such as “apartheid”, “holocaust”, “pogrom” and “war of annihilation” to equate these policies with Nazi crimes against humanity. These positions connect ideological left-wing extremists with Turkish left-wing extremists and Palestinian extremists, leading to joint actions and gatherings against the State of Israel.

The escalation in the Middle East heightened the threat environment in Europe and in Germany, especially regarding Jewish and Israeli targets: Throughout the Federal Republic of Germany, offences connected with the Middle East conflict increased dramatically, with a particularly **massive increase in the number of antisemitic offences** (from 208 in October 2022 to 1,342 in October 2023, with the latter number including 597 offences categorised as foreign ideology, 406 categorised as right-wing extremism, 266 categorised as religious ideologies, 18 categorised as left-wing extremism and 55 offences falling into other categories). Along with cases of antisemitic and anti-Israel property damage, especially graffiti and thrown paint, there was also an attempted arson attack on a synagogue in Berlin.

It was once again evident that the escalation of the Middle East conflict also has direct impacts in Germany on trends in politically motivated criminal offences as well as demonstrations and assemblies, and that various members and sympathisers of extremist organisations are involved in this. The rise in antisemitic incidents – both those tied directly to organisations and those committed by lone individuals – in 2023 illustrates that incitement to hatred and violence through antisemitic ideas can lead to verbal attacks and violent assaults.

Above all, however, the threat in Germany arises from lone perpetrators with jihadist motives who use easily acquired materials and carry out their attacks mainly against “soft” targets. In many of Germany’s neighbouring countries in Europe, attacks by lone actors with Islamist extremist motives were carried out soon after the events in the Middle East. In Germany, multiple suspected planned attacks were able to be stopped in time.

Right-wing extremism/terrorism

By the end of 2023, the number of right-wing extremist sympathisers after subtracting multiple memberships was 40,600 (2022: 38,800). The number of right-wing extremists classified as violence-oriented rose to 14,500 (2022: 14,000).

Right-wing extremist following¹		
	2022	2023
Political party membership	15,500	16,300
Die Heimat (previously Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany)	3,000	2,800
DIE RECHTE (The Right)	450	300
Der III. Weg (The Third Way)	700	800
Suspected threat: Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) ²	10,200	11,300
Membership of other right-wing extremist parties ³	1,150	1,100
Membership of groups/organisations not affiliated with or independent of political parties ⁴	8,500	8,500
No membership of any right-wing extremist grouping/organisation ⁵	16,000	17,000
Total	40,000	41,800
after subtracting multiple memberships	38,800	40,600
of which violence-oriented right-wing extremists	14,000	14,500

1 Some of these figures are estimated and rounded off.

2 This includes the members of Junge Alternative (JA, Young Alternative) which is a sub-organisation of the AfD (suspected threat); the estimated number of double memberships has been taken into account.

3 Membership of other right-wing extremist parties includes among others the members of Freie Sachsen (Free Saxons) and Neue Stärke Partei (NSP, New Strength Party).

4 These numbers include people affiliated with the following intelligence targets: COMPACT-Magazin GmbH (COMPACT Magazine), Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (IBD, Identitarian Movement Germany), PI-NEWS, Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS, Institute for State Policy), Ein Prozent e.V. (One Per Cent) and Verlag Antaios (Antaios publishing house, suspected threat), as well as those among the 1,350 right-wing extremist "Reichsbürger" (literally: citizens of the Reich) and "Selbsterwalter" (literally: self-administrators) who belong to groups/organisations not affiliated with or independent of political parties.

5 In the reporting year, this number includes those out of a total of 1,350 right-wing extremist "Reichsbürger" and "Selbsterwalter" who do not belong to any organised group.

The total number of right-wing extremist criminal and violent offences increased by a significant 22.4% in comparison to the previous year (2022: 20,967; 2023: 25,660). Propaganda offences made up the largest share of right-wing extremist offences at 58.8% (15,081). Violent offences accounted for 4.5% of all right-wing extremist criminal offences. In comparison to the previous year, right-wing extremist violent offences increased by 13.0% in the reporting year (2022: 1,016; 2023: 1,148). At 88.5%, bodily injury offences (1,016) made up the largest share of violent offences and remained at about the same level as in the previous year (2022: 86.5%, 879). Right-wing extremist bodily injury offences with a xenophobic background increased by 16.4% (2022: 751; 2023: 874). The total number of violent offences with a xenophobic background grew as well, by 17.2% (2022: 796; 2023: 933). The number of right-wing extremist offences in the category of coercion/threats saw a significant increase of 24.2% (2022: 417; 2023: 518), while those in the category of property damage also grew dramatically by 31.9% (2022: 592; 2023: 781). Especially noticeable was the rise in offences of incitement to hatred and violence, from 3,125 in 2022 to 4,746 in 2023, an increase of 51.9%.

In 2023, four attempted homicides were recorded (2022: two attempted homicides).

In the reporting year, the HAMAS terrorist attack of 7 October 2023 on the State of Israel provided another striking example of how right-wing extremists seek to **instrumentalise crises** in order to advance their own narratives: some right-wing extremists spoke of pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Germany as having “imported” the conflict to this country, and they described migration in general as the root of social problems in Germany. Against the backdrop of growing numbers of refugees, and in the absence of other subjects of agitation, the issue of migration and asylum once again assumed greater importance for right-wing extremists. In this context, the number of right-wing extremist violent offences directed at collective housing for asylum applicants was significantly higher than in the previous year.

Ever since Russia started its war of aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, right-wing extremists have made the resulting upheaval, which has increased the cost of energy and the overall cost of living in Germany, a focus of their political campaigns and calls for action. At the start of the reporting year, when the energy and economic crisis had lost some of its potential to mobilise support, right-wing extremists, most of whom are pro-Russian and therefore oppose supplying Ukraine with weapons, tried to pass themselves off as peace activists. In general, however, protests by right-wing extremists remained well below the level seen during the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic and therefore failed to meet expectations in the right-wing extremist milieu.

Together with radicalisation that has in recent years increasingly taken place online, group-focused enmity motivated by right-wing extremism forms the basis for **right-wing extremist terrorism**. Social media, messaging services, imageboards and internet platforms like Telegram, where fantasies involving violence and attacks are openly shared, endorsed and potentially encouraged, continue to play the most important role in radicalising right-wing extremists and reinforcing their ideologies in the virtual space. Self-radicalised perpetrators who operate without being associated with known right-wing extremist groups or organisations pose a special challenge for the security authorities. A particular cause for concern is the increasing number of strikingly young people with a strong affinity for violence who are involved in **online communities devoted to right-wing extremist attackers** which are also associated with right-wing extremist accelerationism⁴ (Siege scene⁵).

Effective 19 September 2023, the Federal Minister of the Interior and Community banned the right-wing extremist association **Hammerskins Deutschland**, its regional chapters and its sub-organisation Crew 38, having a total of about

- 4 The theory of accelerationism posits that capitalism can be overcome by intensifying (accelerating) capitalist growth, thereby magnifying the contradictions supposedly inherent in capitalism. According to this theory, enormous technological progress and rising profits of globally active corporations stand in contrast to growing social inequality and social conflicts, which incompetent national governments are unable to resolve. Intensifying these developments will supposedly lead to the collapse of the system of government and the political order as they currently exist.
- 5 The ideology of Siege calls for guerrilla attacks on infrastructure and political decision-makers to increase presumed tensions between the “white” majority society and ethnic minorities in Western countries in order to bring about the downfall of the global political system.

130 members.⁶ The organisation showed similarities to National Socialism in its opposition to the constitutional order and the concept of international understanding; it violated criminal law by enabling criminal offences such as incitement to hatred and violence (section 130 of the German Criminal Code, *Strafgesetzbuch*, StGB) and the use of symbols of unconstitutional organisations (section 86a of the German Criminal Code). The ideology of the Hammerskins Deutschland was focused on protecting the “white Aryan race” and on fighting what its proponents call *Umvolkung*, or the purported replacement of that race by people of other ethnic backgrounds.

Effective 27 September 2023, the Federal Minister of the Interior and Community banned the right-wing extremist association **Artgemeinschaft – Germanische Glaubens-Gemeinschaft wesensgemäßer Lebensgestaltung e.V.** (Community of Believers in a Germanic Lifestyle), its sub-organisation Familienwerk e.V. (Family Aid) and all of its regional groups, with a total following of several hundred persons.⁷ The ban was based on the association’s similarity to National Socialism in its opposition to the constitutional order and the concept of international understanding.

Three other right-wing extremist groups responded to these bans by publicly announcing that they were **disbanding**. These were the neo-Nazi group Arische Bruderschaft (Aryan Brotherhood) and all of its affiliates, including Brigade 12 and Kameradschaft Northeim; the right-wing extremist group Brothers of Honour; and the right-wing extremist network Initiative Zusammenrücken (Initiative to Close Ranks), which since 2020 had been calling on right-wing extremists living in western Germany to relocate to eastern Germany. However, it remains to be seen whether these groups have in fact disbanded and ceased operations, or whether their announcements were simply a tactical manoeuvre to evade action by the state.

6 Legal action to oppose the banning order is pending in the Federal Administrative Court. The ban has not yet taken final and binding effect.

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Again in the reporting year, the security authorities limited **financial activity by right-wing extremists**, for example by stopping right-wing extremist music events in advance or after they had begun, thereby reducing the sale of concert tickets and merchandise. In addition, the domestic intelligence agencies uncovered other financing strategies, such as running restaurants or organising combat sports events.

Again in this reporting year, attending **right-wing extremist music events** made up an important part of the right-wing extremist experience, especially for action-oriented members of the subcultural right-wing extremist scene. In 2023, a record number of right-wing extremist music events was held in Germany, mainly smaller concerts such as singer-songwriter evenings or parties with live music. By contrast, the number of larger concerts was relatively small, with much lower attendance on average. Again in 2023, there were no large-scale, high-profile music events⁸ like those that last took place in 2019.

Again in 2023, right-wing extremists did not manage to organise any **combat sports events** in Germany that drew large audiences. Instead, more right-wing extremists were seen taking part in non-extremist combat sports events, probably due to measures taken by the authorities. However, the European Fight Night planned by the organisers of the right-wing extremist combat sports event known as the Kampf der Nibelungen (KdN, Battle of the Nibelungs) was able to be held in Hungary on 6 May 2023 subject to certain restrictions. A relatively large number of German right-wing extremists took part, and some 150 people attended. Although the size of the audience may not have met the hosts' expectations, photos and videos of the event published on the relevant social media reach a much larger audience and market the KdN label as a "lifestyle" brand.

The image of masculinity, strong affinity for violence, strong sense of community and the associated mentality of "friend or foe" as cultivated in the hooligan scene all lay the groundwork for the scene's ability to connect with

8 Events with more than 500 people in attendance.

extremist, and especially right-wing extremist, groups. As a result, the hooligan and right-wing extremist scenes are regularly found to overlap.

The UEFA EURO 2024 men's **European football championship** could have special significance for right-wing extremist hooligans. For example, hooligan groups in Germany, including those that are right-wing extremist or are influenced by right-wing extremism, could band together to present a massive front against foreign hooligan groups. If they do, groups of hooligans can be expected to commit criminal and violent offences.

Right-wing extremists have in recent years expressed increasingly open and aggressive opposition to the more liberal public discourse on differing sexual orientations and same-sex partnerships and families. They regard heterosexuality and the “traditional” nuclear family as natural in biological terms and therefore without acceptable alternatives. Right-wing extremists initiated a “month of pride” during the reporting year as what they called a “patriotic counter-movement” in opposition to the gay pride month celebrated in June. Various right-wing extremist figures publicly announced this counter-movement, which was joined mainly by people associated with the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (IBD, Identitarian Movement of Germany) and some other figures from the right-wing extremist spectrum.

The name **Neue Rechte** (New Right) refers to an informal network of groups, individuals and organisations, from nationalist-conservative to right-wing extremist, that work together to promote their sometimes anti-liberal and anti-democratic positions in society and the political sphere. Those associated with the Neue Rechte seek to exert influence in the pre-political sphere in order to make their anti-democratic positions a political reality. They perform different and sometimes complementary roles within the network. Their common goal is to bring about a “cultural revolution from the right wing”.

The connections between these figures of the Neue Rechte are also reflected in their view of themselves as strategists (Institut für Staatspolitik, IfS), opinion leaders (COMPACT-Magazin GmbH), networking experts (Ein Prozent

e.V.), publishers (Verlag Antaios, suspected threat) or activists (IBD). The IfS, Ein Prozent e.V. and COMPACT-Magazin GmbH are known to have links to political parties, in particular to Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, suspected threat) and its youth organisation Junge Alternative für Deutschland (JA). The Neue Rechte also work with the Freie Sachsen.

In 2023, violations of human dignity and therefore links to right-wing extremism were noted during anti-migration activities of the Neue Rechte. Indications that the association Ein Prozent e.V. and the IfS are right-wing extremist have been corroborated, and the two are now classified as confirmed right-wing extremist threats.

At its national party convention in Riesa, Saxony, on 3 June 2023, the **Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands** (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany) changed its name to **Die Heimat** (Homeland), after an attempt to change the party's name at its convention in 2022 had failed to gain the necessary majority. But the party's programme and ideology have not changed: as numerous party functionaries stressed following the 2023 convention, the name change did not at all signify accommodation to the political system or moderation in terms of substance. The party programme adopted in 2010 therefore remains unchanged. Proceedings to bar the NPD (now named Die Heimat) from receiving state funding⁹ began in 2019; the oral hearing before the Federal Constitutional Court took place on 4 July 2023.¹⁰

The decline of the party **DIE RECHTE** (The Right), which was already very noticeable in previous years, continued further in the reporting year. The party's loss of significance is indicated firstly by its almost complete lack of activity which gained any public attention; secondly, the party also had to deal with major declines in membership and the loss of organisational structures. In January 2023, a large segment of the party's association in the federal state of

9 Following the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 17 January 2017 in the proceedings to ban the NPD, the Bundestag and Bundesrat passed a constitutional amendment which entered into force on 20 July 2017 and allows anti-constitutional parties to be excluded from public funding for political parties in accordance with Article 21 (3) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) in conjunction with section 13 no. 2a and section 43 et seqq. of the Act on the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz).

10 The judgment of 23 January 2024 bars the party from receiving state funding. See the Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 23 January 2024 – 2 BvB 1/19.

North Rhine-Westphalia, its most important state-level association, left the party to join Die Heimat, and the association was dissolved. As a result, DIE RECHTE lost an integral part of its already declining organisation. Almost the entire membership of the party's association in Dortmund, the most important at district level, left the party.

In 2023, the party **Der III. Weg** (The Third Way) continued expanding its organisation, led by the national party chair. The party founded two new groups, which it calls "bases": Kurhessen (in northern Hesse) and Nord/Ost (in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania). It now has 24 of these local groups. To its three existing state-level associations (Bavaria, Saxony and West, which encompasses the federal states of Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate), the party added a Brandenburg state association in spring of the reporting year. This association is led by the national chair. This means that the party now meets the formal requirements for participating in the state parliamentary elections there and in local elections in 2024.

In 2023, the party stepped up its efforts to recruit young members. With this in mind, it continued expanding the structures of its youth organisation, the Nationalrevolutionäre Jugend (NRJ, National Revolutionary Youth). The NRJ seeks to interest young people in the party and its ideology by organising activities and events aimed at this target group. The NRJ is also intended to create future party cadres. Outreach includes both in-person meetings and lower-threshold contact through various social media. TikTok in particular is increasingly used to share propaganda clips from the NRJ and Der III. Weg.

Again in this reporting year, the regional party **Freie Sachsen** (Free Saxons) was an important factor in demonstrations in the federal state of Saxony. In these demonstrations, a clear shift in the subjects of agitation relevant for the Freie Sachsen was apparent: over the course of the reporting year, the party focused more and more on the related issues of migration and asylum, until by the end of the year, it concentrated almost exclusively on these issues. This shift was likely caused in part by the party's declining ability to mobilise support and the absence of mass protests related to the energy crisis and inflation.

In the reporting year, the Freie Sachsen also continued their familiar strategy of networking. The party tolerates and indeed encourages multiple memberships, so that people who are active in other right-wing extremist organisations, such as Pro Chemnitz or Die Heimat (formerly the NPD), also operate under the aegis of the Freie Sachsen. The few fundamental ideological positions held by the Freie Sachsen include support for a monarchy and Saxony's secession from the Federal Republic of Germany in a so-called "Säxit". This minimal ideological programme enables the Freie Sachsen to form alliances with classic right-wing extremists as well as "Reichsbürger" and "Selbstverwalter".

While the AfD (suspected threat) continued to gain support during the reporting year, most of the **right-wing extremist parties** had little success in elections. Their organisations nonetheless continued to play an important role in the internal networking and cohesion of the right-wing extremist scene.

The **Alternative für Deutschland** (AfD, Alternative for Germany) appealed the March 2022 decision of the Cologne Administrative Court¹¹ confirming BfV's classification of the party as a suspected right-wing extremist threat based on sufficient evidence of anti-constitutional activity. The party appealed the decision with the Higher Administrative Court of the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia.¹² The party announced that its membership had grown in 2023 to 40,131 persons.¹³ Although the party's heterogeneity is declining significantly, the membership remains heterogenous enough that not all party members can be regarded as supporting extremist ideas. The number of party members who can be regarded as extremist is about 11,000; this number is based on statements by party functionaries and on the results of voting at an assembly held in Magdeburg, Saxony-Anhalt, on 29–30 July and 4–6 August 2023 for the upcoming European parliamentary elections.

Statements by the AfD (suspected threat) and its representatives often reflect an understanding of the nation that is racist, is based on ancestry and contradicts

11 Cologne Administrative Court, judgment of 8 March 2022 – 13 K 326/21.

12 The Higher Administrative Court denied the appeal in its judgment of 13 May 2024 (5A 1218/22). The court did not allow an appeal on points of law only; this decision may be appealed with the Federal Administrative Court.

13 Der Tagesspiegel, 2 January 2024.

the understanding of the nation enshrined in Germany's constitution, the Basic Law.¹⁴ Many statements made by the AfD (suspected threat) during the reporting year also expressed views hostile to foreigners and Muslims. Such statements often accused asylum-seekers and migrants from Muslim countries of origin of cultural incompatibility and a strong propensity for crime. Again in 2023, numerous AfD functionaries and elected officials were found to have firm connections to individuals and organisations of the extremist segment of the *Neue Rechte*. These connections are not merely coincidental, but are structural connections within a network that operates strategically.

The **Junge Alternative** (JA, Young Alternative) was founded in 2013 and is the official youth organisation of the AfD (suspected threat). It is made up of 16 state-level associations and had some 4,000 members in late 2023, according to the organisation.¹⁵ In January 2019, BfV began monitoring the JA as a suspected threat. The Cologne Administrative Court (North Rhine-Westphalia) confirmed this classification in March 2022. The court found that there are facts indicating that a key political aim of the JA is maintaining the ethnic purity of the German "Volk" and excluding people of other ethnicities wherever possible. The court ruled that such a nationalist and racist concept of the nation represented a violation of human dignity.¹⁶ Leading JA functionaries continue to support such positions even after the court's decision. The JA and the AfD (suspected threat) have appealed the decision with the Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia.¹⁷

In April 2023, BfV classified the JA as a confirmed extremist threat. The JA initiated legal proceedings on 12 June 2023 to oppose this classification and asked the Cologne Administrative Court to provide immediate legal protection. On 14 June 2023, BfV agreed with the Administrative Court to postpone classifying the JA as a confirmed extremist threat until the relevant chamber announced its decision in an expedited procedure. Until then, BfV said it

14 Cologne Administrative Court, judgment of 8 March 2022 – 13 K 326/21.

15 YouTube, 18 December 2023.

16 Cologne Administrative Court, judgment of 8 March 2022 – 13 K 208/20.

17 The Higher Administrative Court denied the appeal in its judgment of 13 May 2024 (5A 1217/22). The court did not allow an appeal on points of law only; this decision may be appealed with the Federal Administrative Court.

would treat the JA as a suspected threat and would not publicly describe it as a confirmed extremist threat.¹⁸

18 In an expedited procedure, the Cologne Administrative Court decided on 5 February 2024, following a summary assessment, that BfV's classification of the JA as a confirmed extremist threat was legal. BfV therefore resumed monitoring the JA as a confirmed extremist threat on 5 February 2024. The JA and the AfD (suspected threat) submitted a complaint to the Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia regarding the decision. The decision on the merits of the case and the Higher Administrative Court's decision regarding the complaint are still pending.

“Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”

“Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” comprise groups and individuals who, for various reasons, deny the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany and reject its legal system. Some “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” are also clearly right-wing extremists. However, the majority of “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” display few, if any, elements of right-wing extremist ideology.

In 2023, about 25,000 individuals nationwide belonged to the “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” scene (2022: 23,000). Some 1,350 of them (2022: 1,250), or slightly more than 5%, can be considered right-wing extremist as well. About 2,500 individuals, or 10%, should be considered **violence-oriented** (2022: 2,300). This number includes violent members of the scene as well as people who have come to the attention of the authorities by making threats or statements endorsing violence.

The **increase in the numbers of “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”** is largely due to the growing tendency to network and join forces with other types of extremists (right-wing extremists, anti-constitutional delegitimation of the state), with whom they share a penchant for conspiracy theories and hostility to government and democracy which they exhibit to varying degrees. Networks arise out of extremist-influenced protests or Telegram chat groups, for example. Such interaction between “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” and extremist groups can lead to special threats, as current investigations into the suspected formation of terrorist organisations have shown.

Among the extremists newly recorded as members of the “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” scene, the share of women rose from 23% in 2017 to 43% in 2023. And more young people have joined the scene too: the number of newly recorded 18- to 29-year-olds rose between 2017 and 2022 by about three percentage points irrespective of gender, while the number of those over 60 fell by 14% for men and 23% for women.

When “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” engage with the topic of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, they predominantly espouse narratives taken from Russian state propaganda. Some of them – both individuals and organisations – display a keen affinity for the Russian Federation and regularly take strongly pro-Russian positions.

To achieve their aims, “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” deliberately disrupt the work of public administration and rule-of-law processes. They still most often use the tactic of **flooding government agencies and offices with large numbers of long letters** containing obscure or muddled arguments or claims and dubious interpretations of the law. Statements in the letters range from simple rejection of official activity all the way to insults, coercion and extortion, sometimes accompanied by threats of violence.

Activities which earn some “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” considerable revenue from others in the scene are especially important. A number of groups and individuals within the scene sell invalid fantasy documents such as “driving licences” and “licence plates” to others. They also offer expensive seminars, “legal advice” and lectures.

During the reporting year, the “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” group **Königreich Deutschland** (KRD, Kingdom of Germany) continued trying to attract supporters by claiming that “residents of the KRD” would not owe any taxes to the Federal Republic of Germany. The group also further pursued its strategy of acquiring property to build what it calls “structures for the common good”, with the aim of enlarging the “territory” of its “kingdom”.

Like other “Reichsbürger” organisations, the **Indigenes Volk Germaniten** (IVG, Indigenous People Germaniten) bought property during the reporting year for use within the scene. The IVG, which was founded in 2010, has increasingly grown since the COVID-19 pandemic; in 2023, it organised events and lectures.

Because of the potential threat they pose to the free and democratic constitutional system, “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” continue to be the

focus of government action. For example, in March, May and June 2023, police carried out **further enforcement measures against the “Reichsbürger” group around Heinrich XIII. P. R.**, following the nationwide enforcement measures taken in December 2022. Searches were conducted as part of an investigation led by the Federal Public Prosecutor General on suspicion of forming a terrorist organisation as well as other criminal offences. The group planned to overthrow the political system in Germany by force and replace it with its own power structure. The group’s membership and ideology were extremely heterogeneous; they drew on conspiracy narratives typical of the “Reichsbürger” scene such as the S.H.A.E.F.¹⁹ conspiracy theory and QAnon,²⁰ as well as elements of far-right ideology and New Age beliefs.

Further, in March and November 2023, the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg sentenced two “Reichsbürger” to long terms in prison for attempted murder coinciding with inflicting dangerous bodily harm and resisting enforcement officers, among other offences. One of those convicted had intentionally run over a police officer with his car during a traffic check in February 2022, seriously injuring the officer. The other convicted “Reichsbürger” had, in April 2022, fired a weapon at a special operations team which was searching his home for the purpose of securing weapons; two of the team members were injured.

The **affinity for weapons** of many “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” continues to pose a threat. In the course of government action, weapons and explosives are repeatedly found in the possession of “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” and confiscated. For example, police searching property of a “Reichsbürger” in February 2023 found a large number of weapons, including numerous machine guns, submachine guns and pump guns, along with large quantities of ammunition. When police searched the home of a suspect

19 Followers of this conspiracy theory refer to the laws of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (S.H.A.E.F.), which held the supreme command of the Western allied armed forces in Europe during the Second World War and was dissolved after the end of the war. The theory claims that S.H.A.E.F. is still the legitimate administrative power in Germany and its laws are still in effect.

20 This conspiracy theory is based on the idea that a secret elite, often described as Satanists and paedophiles and referred to as the Deep State, is striving to establish a global dictatorship or “new world order”.

classified as a “Reichsbürger” in March 2023, they found and seized three live hand grenades.

In 2023, the weapons permits of some 200 “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” were revoked or voluntarily returned by their owners in connection with a government measure, such as following a hearing by the weapons authority. At the end of 2023, about 400 “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” still had at least one weapons permit.

“Anti-constitutional delegitimisation of the state”

Those who are active in the field of “anti-constitutional delegitimisation of the state” aim to abolish basic constitutional principles or to impede the ability of the government or its institutions to function. They disparage democratic decision-making processes and institutions or call upon others to ignore the orders and decisions of courts and public authorities. This undermines the democratic order by weakening trust in the state system as a whole, thereby endangering its ability to function. Only such systematic delegitimisation reaching a considerable level of significance is of relevance in a domestic intelligence context. These activities stand in opposition to basic constitutional principles, especially the principles of democracy and the rule of law.

Nationwide, some 1,600 (2022: 1,400) people were identified as belonging to the delegitimisation spectrum during the reporting period, some 250 (2022: 280) of whom, i.e. 15% of the individuals belonging to this milieu, are considered to be violence-oriented.²¹ This means that these individuals either advocate or support the use of violence by others in the context of their agitation or that they are ready to use or actually use violence themselves. They describe the Federal Republic of Germany as a “repressive dictatorship” and thus draw the conclusion that they have a supposedly legitimate right of resistance. Therefore, they consider the use of violence to be justified under certain conditions, for example to counter the supposedly illegitimate interference of the allegedly authoritarian state.

In contrast to other fields of extremism, those who are active in the field of “anti-constitutional delegitimisation of the state” less frequently form fixed permanent structures but often act solely in loosely organised groups or as individuals. They are characterised by their sustained agitation against democratically elected representatives of the state. This particularly enables them to connect with right-wing extremists and with “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”.

21 The drop in the number of violence-oriented individuals compared to the previous year and the simultaneous increase in the overall following is presumably connected to the lifting of the public COVID-19-related protective measures and the fact that the scene’s central topic of agitation, emotionalisation and mobilisation thus no longer exists.

It is mainly the communication on social media that encourages such radicalisation tendencies among those active in this spectrum. In this context, ideologemes are spread unfiltered via various platforms like the internet platform Telegram. Statements by individual members showing a massive lack of respect for human dignity or oriented towards violence often go unchallenged or are even actively supported. Furthermore, mobilisation for demonstrations and activities takes place. There continues to be a risk that individuals or groups may become radicalised.

An example in this context is the grouping Vereinte Patrioten (United Patriots), which included individuals from the delegitimisation spectrum as well as right-wing extremists and “Reichsbürger”. This initially loosely structured group exchanged ideas about possible attacks via the internet platform Telegram, radicalised itself and established fixed organisational structures. The group planned to bring about civil war-like conditions by attacking critical infrastructure in Germany and to replace the political system by an “imperial constitution” based on the 1871 constitution of the German Empire. In this context, they also planned to abduct Federal Minister of Health Karl Lauterbach, with the expectation that they might have to kill Lauterbach’s bodyguards.

On 11 January 2023, the Public Prosecutor General at the Federal Court of Justice brought charges against the five main defendants, among other things for forming a terrorist organisation and/or participating as members of a terrorist organisation (section 129a of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB)) as well as for preparing a high treasonous undertaking against the Federation (section 83 (1) of the German Criminal Code). On 17 May 2023, the trial began at the Koblenz Higher Regional Court. On 10 October 2023, further law enforcement measures coordinated by the Criminal Police Office of the federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate took place against other suspects in the Vereinte Patrioten case.²²

²² On 29 January 2024, the Koblenz Public Prosecutor General brought charges against two further individuals associated with Vereinte Patrioten. The two individuals are accused of having supported a terrorist organisation and of having prepared and/or aided in a high treasonous undertaking against the Federation. On 18 April 2024, the trial began at the Koblenz Higher Regional Court.

Left-wing extremism

The **left-wing extremist following** (after subtracting multiple memberships) rose by 1.4% to a total of 37,000 individuals in 2023. 11,200 of them can be classed as violence-oriented.

Left-wing extremist following ¹			
	2021	2022	2023
Violence-oriented left-wing extremists	10,300	10,800	11,200
of which, from the autonomist scene	8,000	8,300	8,300
Non-violent strictly ideological left-wing extremists and other left-wing extremists	25,500	27,600	27,800
Total	35,800	38,400	39,000
after subtracting multiple memberships	34,700	36,500	37,000
1 Some of these figures are estimated and rounded off.			

Left-wing extremists seek to abolish the existing state and social order and thus the free democratic basic order. With this in mind, issues such as “anti-fascism”, “anti-capitalism”, “anti-repression” or “anti-gentrification” are, depending on the circumstances, relevant but ultimately interchangeable areas of action which only serve to advance left-wing extremists’ ideological objectives: the establishment of a communist system or of an anarchist society that is “free from rule”.

The number of **criminal offences motivated by left-wing extremism** rose by 10.4% to 4,248 in 2023. The increase in the number of acts of violence by 20.8% to 727 is even more significant. There was a particularly sharp increase with regard to violence against police officers. In response to the conviction of left-wing extremist violent offenders around the main defendant Lina

E. in May 2023, the left-wing extremist scene carried out numerous further criminal and violent offences, including two attempted killings of police officers in Leipzig (Saxony), according to the investigations so far. In addition, serious attacks on actual or supposed right-wing extremists continue to occur in Germany and abroad.

The potential threat posed by **violent left-wing extremism** remains high. It is worrying that there is a discernible potential for further radicalisation of individual violent offenders and networks and of their forms of action, even though this has not happened yet. It is only due to luck that during attacks on police officers carried out by violent left-wing extremists and in their “anti-fascist struggle”, none of the victims have died so far. Small autonomist groups have shown an increasingly professional *modus operandi* and have also acted across borders by networking with left-wing extremists from other countries. Existing network structures have consolidated and radicalised; in addition, new structures have emerged in “militant anti-fascism”, thus increasing the pool of potential activists. Even though the line to terrorism has not been crossed yet, the **risk that serious acts of violence may be committed against individuals has further increased**. If the radicalisation of individuals or structures continues unhindered, a new left-wing terrorism might develop in Germany, which is likely to be directed mostly against individuals considered to be “fascists”, but it might also cause more violence against the state and the police. Moreover, through attacks on **business companies** but increasingly also on **critical infrastructure**, left-wing extremists caused material damage amounting to millions of euros in 2023 too. Attacks on infrastructures such as cable ducts, telecommunications equipment or railway facilities mean that large parts of the population may be affected by left-wing extremist criminal and violent offences.

Against the background of the “**anti-fascist struggle**”, violent left-wing extremists carry out serious physical attacks against individuals identified by them as “fascist”. In the year under review, such attacks took place in Erfurt and in Budapest (Hungary), among other places. Furthermore, the Dresden Higher Regional Court sentenced four violent left-wing extremists (including Lina E.)

to several years in prison without parole. They were accused of three violent attacks against political opponents which they had committed as members and/or supporters of a criminal organisation. Among other things, the four individuals are part of a network considered responsible for numerous acts of violence against supposed right-wing extremists in the past years. Within the left-wing extremist scene, the name “**Antifa-Ost**” (“Antifa East”) is now used for this network. Individuals belonging to this network are strongly suspected of having participated in the attacks carried out in the context of the right-wing extremist event “Day of Honour” which took place in Budapest from 9 to 11 February. In 2023 already, two suspected left-wing extremist perpetrators were arrested.²³ The other suspected perpetrators managed to escape the police after having committed the act and most of them have been in hiding since. They are wanted on a European arrest warrant. It is not to be expected that this circle of individuals will turn away from violence. It is rather to be feared that, over time, a further radicalisation will take place.

The establishment of the **Antifaschistische Aktion Süd** (“**Antifa Süd**”, “**Antifa South**”) in 2022 marked a new development in the left-wing extremists’ violent “anti-fascist struggle”. In contrast to the loose network “Antifa Ost”, this network has fixed structures composed of a total of eight regional groups. The main focus of “Antifa Süd” is on combining “anti-fascist” forces more efficiently than before. The long-term goal of “Antifa Süd” is a Germany-wide “Antifaschistische Aktion” (“Antifascist Action”).

It is not just supposed right-wing extremists that the left-wing extremist scene regularly labels as “fascists”. This term is also applied to the state, its free democratic order and the persons representing it. Violence-oriented left-wing extremists consider crimes and violence to be essential elements of their “anti-fascist struggle”. Crimes in this context range from **doxing** to threats, damage to or destruction of property, arson attacks on vehicles or meeting places to brutal physical attacks on supposedly “fascist” people, often also in their private environment. In their “anti-fascist struggle”, even unrestrained brutality and extreme violence against persons is a legitimate and

23 In May 2024, another suspected left-wing extremist perpetrator was arrested.

even necessary means in the eyes of left-wing extremists. They justify their violent approach with the state bodies allegedly being inactive in fighting “racists” and “fascists”. The point of regularly using or at least threatening to use violence against the “right-wing” and right-wing extremist scene as defined by left-wing extremists is to create a permanent sense of fear.

Violence-oriented left-wing extremists still see the **police** as their greatest enemy in the fight against the state they so vehemently oppose. Most left-wing extremist violent offences are therefore directed against police officers, their vehicles and their facilities. Violence-oriented left-wing extremists in particular disparage police officers as “murderers in uniform” and “pigs” and think that they deserve to suffer physical violence solely because of their career choice. **Members of the judiciary** representing the alleged “repressive state” are also the focus of violence-oriented left-wing extremism. In addition to attacks in connection with demonstrations or other events, there are also crimes directed against individual police officers and members of the judiciary in their private environment. These targeted attacks, which are sometimes extensively planned, show the considerable criminal energy of the offenders.

Left-wing extremist arson attacks or damage to vehicles, machines or infrastructure belonging to **business companies** cause damage amounting to millions of euros in Germany every year. Left-wing extremists try to provide an ideological justification for their actions by embedding their attacks in the context of “anti-militarism”, “anti-repression” or “anti-gentrification”.

In addition, left-wing extremists justify their attacks on companies or critical infrastructure by an alleged commitment to **climate action**. Left-wing extremists use this topic in order to attempt to shift democratic discourse, to add their own ideological positions, to radicalise social protest and to delegitimise the state and its institutions. Protagonists from the field of violence-oriented left-wing extremism therefore strive time and again to establish arson attacks and sabotage as militant forms of action within the climate protest movement. In the context of their criminal offences, left-wing extremists claim that it is only possible to avert the “climate catastrophe” by fundamentally overthrowing the

system. Especially the eviction and demolition of the village of **Lützerath** for the purpose of lignite mining was an important reference point for climate protests in the spring of 2023 and was also extensively addressed by left-wing extremists. The protests against the eviction of Lützerath are a prime example of an attempt by left-wing extremists to radicalise democratic protests and use them as a platform for their violence.

Forms of action which are used by left-wing extremists in the context of climate protests include blockades and occupations targeting energy infrastructure facilities and companies. Such actions are then referred to as “**civil disobedience**”. By using this term, the deliberate and sometimes violent resistance to the democratic and constitutional state monopoly on the use of force is put on the same level as non-violent protests against systems of injustice by human and civil rights movements.

Although there are currently no indications that left-wing extremists have a controlling influence, violence-oriented left-wing extremists intend to use action alliances to influence the climate protest movement. Given that climate activists still consider the climate situation urgent, these protests have a potential for escalation that is useful to left-wing extremists. Due to the often young age of the protesters and because their protests attract considerable public attention, the climate protest movement is still attractive to left-wing extremists from different spectra.

In addition to the established actors and beyond concrete actions, new militant small groups and campaigns develop time and again. Since late 2022, a new left-wing extremist group called **Guerrilla Activists Fighting For Anarchy (GAFFA)** has come to notice. GAFFA criticises the principle of non-violence propagated by the democratic climate protest movement and calls for violent action for the purpose of overcoming the “capitalist social order”. Specifically, the group wants to carry out acts of sabotage to cause significant damage to the image of and considerable financial damage to the operator of the infrastructure of the Rhenish lignite mining area in order to thus ultimately stop the extraction of fossil energy. For example, GAFFA claimed responsibility for

several arson attacks partly involving heavy damage to property and, at the same time, announced further acts of sabotage.

The alliance **Ende Gelände**, which was founded by the post-autonomist **Interventionistische Linke (IL, Interventionist Left)** in 2014, plays a key role. In the 2023 Report on the Protection of the Constitution, Ende Gelände is classified as a suspected threat by BfV for the first time. Ende Gelände has been able to profit from the high level of dynamism that has marked the German climate protest movement in recent years. The alliance has emancipated itself from the IL, both in structural and in ideological terms, and has established itself as a cooperation partner for members of the autonomist and strictly ideological left-wing extremist scene. At the same time, an increasingly independent intensification of the forms of action to the point of sabotage as well as, in position papers, a radicalisation with regard to the predominant ideological positions of the alliance has also become apparent. Moreover, the previous range of topics has been expanded to include other content relevant to the scene. For example, Ende Gelände demanded the release of the convicted left-wing extremist violent offender Lina E. and, in this context, mobilised for “Day X” in Leipzig during which violent riots by violent left-wing extremists occurred.

With their new campaign **“Switch off – the system of destruction”** initiated in early 2023, left-wing extremists have created a link between the traditional left-wing extremist field of action of “anti-capitalism” and climate-policy topics. In the campaign’s appeal, any government action to solve the climate crisis is rejected. Instead, it calls for attacks on those responsible for “the destruction of nature” as well as on the “infrastructure of capitalism”. “Switch off” is a “join in campaign” with the objective of motivating others to commit crimes in order to create a feeling of togetherness. In addition, violence-oriented left-wing extremists are to be given a platform and the commission of crimes is to be established as an effective and accepted strategy within the climate protest movement. The label “Switch off” has since been used in numerous statements claiming responsibility for damage to property and arson attacks, some of which have caused considerable damage. Regarding the year 2023

alone, more than 50 attacks are placed in the context of “Switch off” on the campaign’s website.

After the **HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel** on 7 October 2023, left-wing extremists too participated in numerous gatherings in Germany. In this matter, the scene seemed divided. While the majority of autonomists took a pro-Israel stance, anti-imperialist left-wing extremists as well as strictly ideological left-wing extremists, and thus the largest part of the scene, expressed anti-Israel views and mobilised for participation in pro-Palestinian demonstrations. In this context, various links with Palestinian extremists as well as with Turkish left-wing extremists became apparent.

Creating networks with individuals from Germany and abroad who share the same ideology has a long tradition within left-wing extremism and may also result in strategic approaches for cooperation developing at different levels. German left-wing extremists thus cooperate closely with Turkish left-wing extremist organisations on a regular basis, for example in the context of demonstrations or joint events. They also express their solidarity with the Kurdish efforts to gain autonomy and especially with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is banned in Germany. PKK uses that commitment for propaganda activities in Germany as well as for the recruitment of individuals to fight in the Kurdish settlement areas. Since 2013, about 70 individuals from the German left-wing extremist spectrum have thus left for the Southeast of Turkey, for Northern Syria or for Northern Iraq. Most of these individuals have joined PKK or groups close to PKK. On site, they have engaged in activities ranging from humanitarian assistance to pro-Kurdish propaganda and, in some cases, to taking active part in combat action. Due to their level of radicalisation, left-wing extremists from the German spectrum who have combat experience pose a particular security risk after their return because they might use the skills they have gained in the handling of weapons or explosives in Germany too.

Strictly ideological left-wing extremists especially share the fundamental conviction that **young people** are of crucial importance as **central revolutionary**

potential. With their strength and commitment, young people are meant to provide the foundation for the “revolutionary mass basis” that is envisaged. In order to attract children, adolescents and young adults, left-wing extremist youth organisations carry out increasingly intensive and intrusive ideological recruitment activities in front of schools, businesses and universities. At the same time, they try to instrumentalise democratic movements, for example union rallies and education protests. Since October 2023, pro-Palestinian demonstrations have increasingly become a focus and have been used by left-wing extremists to try to recruit and mobilise new and also younger followers. Left-wing extremists are especially active regarding schools. The Trotskyist youth association **REVOLUTION (REVO)** was very successful in recruiting young members in 2023. Through the intensive use of social media, strictly ideological left-wing extremists have moreover significantly increased their reach.

Topics like Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine or “solidarity with Palestine” are regularly misused to try to turn young people’s commitment to humanitarian causes into communist resistance against alleged “militarism”, “imperialism”, “colonialism” and “capitalism”. Left-wing extremists use demonstrations as an opportunity to approach dedicated young people and to convince them of their ideology as well as to recruit members. The **Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany)** also uses this strategy. Accordingly, the MLPD puts a lot of effort into youth work: There are MLPD children’s and youth associations (**REBELL**), annual youth festivals are organised and well-trained members are sent out to take part in demonstrations where they promote the MLPD’s ideology by intensively advertising it.

Left-wing extremists need to attract public attention in order to spread their ideology. Violence-oriented left-wing extremists also require a platform where they can explain their criminal and violent acts to the public and lend weight to their demands. The **left-wing extremist website de.indymedia** is currently the most important information and propaganda channel for left-wing extremists in German-speaking countries. There are numerous contributions

on de.indymedia that are linked to left-wing extremist violence and crimes or that are liable to prosecution themselves. For instance, letters claiming responsibility are often published on the website. At the same time, there are calls for committing further acts. Cases of doxing frequently occur on de.indymedia. In that way, left-wing extremists are knowingly and deliberately provided with a platform that very much serves an anti-constitutional purpose.

In addition to de.indymedia, there are various platforms which relate to specific cities or regions in German-speaking countries and which are also used by left-wing extremists. These platforms include kontrapolis.info (Berlin), tumulte.org (Bremen) and knack.news (Leipzig). Posts from de.indymedia are also published on these websites, but they moreover contain exclusive content with mainly regional relevance. The content published on these and other German, Austrian and Swiss platforms used by left-wing extremists can also be accessed on **radikal.news – Nachrichten von Unten** (news from below). This website describes itself as “a network of self-organised information pages” for German-speaking countries.

Left-wing extremist organisations and individuals actively use **social media** for effective and spontaneous mobilisation. There, they spread ideological texts and “stories” quickly and widely, thus specifically addressing younger users in particular. Especially popular platforms like Facebook, Instagram and X (formerly Twitter) are used since the largest audience can be reached via these platforms.

Left-wing extremists now also use social media to publish podcasts; they create YouTube channels and publish their content via audio streaming services. Examples of such formats with left-wing extremist content are “Ende Gelände – Der Podcast” (“Ende Gelände – The podcast”), “Die Kommunisten Kneipe” (“The communists’ pub”), “Die Lage der Klasse” (“The state of the class”) by the Trotskyist Gruppe ArbeiterInnenmacht (GAM, Group Workers’ Power) or “99 zu Eins” (“99 to one”) originating from the anarcho-communist spectrum. The creators of the podcasts are well versed in the use of social media and also try to act as “influencers”. In that way, they apparently intend

to promote the visibility of their ideas in wider, non-extremist parts of society. This reach beyond their own spectrum and the possibility this brings to gain more followers is likely to have motivated left-wing extremists to use relatively new and successful online formats like podcasts for their political purposes.

Islamist extremism/terrorism

Compared to the previous year, the Islamist extremist following remained approximately the same in 2023 and comprised 27,200 individuals (2022: 27,480).

Following in the field of Islamist extremism/terrorism ¹		
Organisations	2022	2023
Salafist movements	11,000	10,500
Islamic State (IS) and regional branches Al-Qaeda (AQ) and regional branches	no confirmed figures	no confirmed figures
Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (HIA)	160	210
Hezbollah	1,250	1,250
Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (HAMAS)	450	450
Turkish Hezbollah (TH)	400	400
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT)	750	800
Muslim Brotherhood (MB)/ Deutsche Muslimische Gemeinschaft e.V. (DMG, German Muslim Community)	1,450	1,450
Tablighi Jama'at (TJ)	550	550
Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg e.V. (IZH) (Islamic Centre Hamburg) and other Shia extremist organisations	no confirmed figures	no confirmed figures
Millî Görüş movement and affiliated associations (IGMG)	10,000	10,000
Furkan Gemeinschaft (Furkan Community)	400	500
Kalifatsstaat (Caliphate State)	700	700
Others ²	370	390
¹ Figures refer to Germany; they are partly estimated and rounded off. ² Other organisations whose membership figures/figures of adherents are to be taken into account as regards the Islamist extremist following.		

Islamist terrorism continues to pose a threat in Germany as well as to German interests and institutions all over the world and has increased further since the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent military confrontation in the Gaza Strip. In Germany, the threat emanates from lone actors with jihadist motivations as well as from jihadist groups. In addition to the less complex attacks primarily directed against “soft targets” that have been predominant in recent years, more complex attack projects still have to be expected too.

In 2023, there was one **attack** in Germany that was undoubtedly motivated by Islamist extremism: On 9 and 18 April 2023 one and the same perpetrator attacked people with a knife in Duisburg (North Rhine-Westphalia); one person was killed and four others were injured, some of them critically. The perpetrator claimed to have acted on behalf of Islamic State (IS). In other European countries, too, there were attacks whose authors considered that they were acting on behalf of IS: On 13 October 2023 a teacher was stabbed to death in Arras (France), on 16 October 2023 two Swedish football fans were shot dead in Brussels (Belgium) and one other football fan was severely injured, and on 2 December 2023 an IS sympathiser attacked several people with a knife and a hammer in Paris (France), killing a German citizen. The two last-mentioned attacks are considered to be directly linked to renewed, explicit calls of IS for attacks in the West. The same is true for the arrest of two youths on 28 November 2023 who had thought about a Christmas market in Leverkusen (North Rhine-Westphalia) as a potential attack target.

The attacks as well as the **planned attacks** thwarted by German and European security authorities in 2023 clearly prove that the jihadist ideology continues to be present. The focus of terrorist jihadist organisations and especially of IS but also of al-Qaeda is still and increasingly on Europe, and thus on Germany too. By spreading terror, both through attacks by lone perpetrators and through coordinated large-scale terrorist attacks as in the past, these terrorist networks acting globally aim to weaken their opponents and to implement their claim to power motivated by jihadism. Both organisations have used the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel as well as the subsequent military confrontation in

the Gaza Strip as an opportunity to massively propagate the enemy images of “Israel” and the “Jews” and to call for “jihad” against them as well as against their allies in the West. The Middle East conflict was thus instrumentalised for propaganda and recruitment purposes by jihadist and other Islamist extremist groups.

In connection with the military confrontation in the Gaza Strip, various actors belonging to different Islamist extremist groups and tendencies that had, until then, been active separately and independently from one another have appeared and acted together for the first time. One example of this is the fundraising event “One Ummah Spendengala” which took place in Hamburg on 28 October 2023 and in which Salafists, including a well-known preacher, and individuals associated with the Furkan Gemeinschaft (Furkan Community) took part. This **form of united action** is a new phenomenon in the Islamist extremist scene in Germany.

In addition to the Middle East conflict, Koran burnings and the LGBTQ movement have been central topics of jihadist **propaganda**. Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP), the IS branch in Afghanistan, has further diversified its high-gloss propaganda magazine “VOICE OF KHURASAN” in terms of languages, regions and content. In the light of the Middle East conflict, attack threats against the West have markedly increased.

Currently, **ISKP** seems to be the strongest regional branch of IS. After ISKP had so far focused on carrying out attacks in Afghanistan, there are more and more indications to suggest that Germany and Europe are now also regarded as potential targets for attacks. From ISKP’s perspective, this would increase the organisation’s standing among its followers while challenging the authority of the Taliban in Afghanistan, putting them under increased international pressure. The law enforcement measures carried out in July 2023 have shown that Germany, too, is a target of ISKP. The suspects are nationals of various Central Asian states who left Ukraine for Germany almost simultaneously in the wake of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in the spring of 2022.

They are suspected of having formed a terrorist organisation, with the aim of committing high-profile attacks in Germany.

With around 10,500 followers, **Salafism** remains the Islamist extremist movement with the largest number of adherents in Germany. Even though the Salafist following slightly decreased in recent years, 2023 saw a renewed increase in the Salafist scene's activities, also on the internet. Tried and tested activities were resumed and new activities were initiated. While the core ideology remains unchanged, a change is taking place especially with regard to social media communication and mobilisation through populist and identity-focused discourse. On TikTok especially, Salafist influencers have a considerable reach.

After the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, **groups** such as Realität Islam (Reality Islam, RI), Generation Islam (GI) or Muslim Interaktiv (Muslim Interactive, MI), **which have ideological ties to Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT)**, have further intensified their professionally organised appearances that are also used for online publicity and have been increasingly aggressive and extremist when staging their actions and in the language they use. They build on discourses related to identity politics, for example by referring to the "colonial oppression of the Islamic world" in order to justify Islamist extremist activities. Furthermore, they claim that the state is stirring Islamophobia and they defame Germany's integration policy as some kind of "assimilation terror" which allegedly makes all Muslims victims of systematic discrimination by the state and society.

Sexual and gender diversity, which is called for and lived out in pluralistic societies, is more or less explicitly rejected by all Islamist extremist ideologies, especially homosexuality and trans identity. Salafist clerics in particular have taken a clear stand against practised homosexuality, which is denounced as a "crime of fornication". Regarding the year 2023, the massive hostility against Muslims who have shown themselves to be open-minded about **LGBTQ** have to be emphasised.

Antisemitic ideas are an important common denominator in the ideology of the entire Islamist extremist spectrum and have the potential to attract followers far beyond this spectrum. As shown by the reactions to the situation in the Middle East since the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel in October 2023, the hostility towards Jews and the hostility towards Israel now almost go hand in hand. Islamist extremist propaganda not only promotes antisemitic ideas, but it also calls for ideas to be followed by deeds.

Due to the ban imposed by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community on 2 November 2023, **HAMAS is no longer allowed** to undertake any kind of activities in Germany. In this context, searches were carried out in five federal states (Berlin, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein) on 23 November 2023. On 14 December 2023, four suspected HAMAS members were arrested in Berlin and in the Netherlands. They are said to have been involved in external operations by HAMAS and to have been closely linked to the leadership of the military sub-organisation of HAMAS, the Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and to have been involved in potential attack plans against Jewish targets in Europe.

Wars and conflicts are increasingly used for the **financing of terrorism and extremism** under the cover of charity. In connection with Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the earthquakes in Turkey and Syria as well the situation in the Gaza Strip, an increasing number of calls for donations or financial transfers linked to Islamist extremist or terrorist organisations have been identified. The changing risks and their aspects as well as the dynamic developments regarding financing activities require a continuous and intensive exchange of information and experience as well as coordination between the security authorities. In this context, national and international measures to combat the financing of terrorism and extremism go hand in hand and form a holistic approach. In May 2023, about 100 search warrants were simultaneously executed in several German federal states as well as in the Netherlands and 7 individuals were arrested. The measures were carried out in connection with investigations into online fundraising projects for the benefit of the wives and children of former IS fighters detained in Syrian-Kurdish camps.

Foreign extremism

In 2023, the **foreign extremist following** rose by 3% to now 30,650 individuals (2022: 29,750). The most significant organisation in Germany in terms of numbers remains the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) with 15,000 followers.

Foreign extremist following in Germany ¹			
	2021	2022	2023
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	14,500	14,500	15,000
Turkish right-wing extremism	11,000	12,100	12,500
Turkish left-wing extremism	2,550	2,550	2,500
Secular Palestinian extremism	200	200	250
Others	400	400	400
Total	28,650	29,750	30,650
1 Some of these figures are estimated and rounded off.			

In 2023, **crimes** with a foreign extremist background once again increased considerably. In 2023, there was again a significant increase in the number of crimes by 56.6% to now 3,092 offences (2022: 1,974). The number of violent crimes rose by 45.6% to 329 (2022: 226).

The significant increase can mainly be explained by the reactions to the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent response by the Israeli armed forces in the Gaza Strip. Various extremists from the field of foreign extremism also participated in the numerous protests and crimes that took place in Germany in that context. More than half of the criminal offences committed by this spectrum in 2023 – around 1,700 offences – had an anti-Israel and/or pro-Palestinian background. More than 1,044 of these offences (2022: 58, +1,700%) were linked to antisemitism. This overall sharp

increase is primarily due to the impact of the development of the situation in the Middle East.

In contrast, the 219 bodily injury offences (2022: 141, +55.3%) and 56 offences of resistance to police officers (2022: 50, +12.0%) cannot be explained solely by the resurgent Middle East conflict. Instead, this clearly illustrates the **potential for violence** which generally predominates in the field of foreign extremism in Germany too.

Foreign extremism includes organisations adhering to ideological elements of right-wing and left-wing extremism and organisations pursuing separatist efforts in their home countries. The policy, strategy and activities pursued by the structures active in Germany are mainly determined by the situation in the regions they have links to and by the instructions issued by the central organisational units there. In their home countries, these organisations usually want to bring about drastic political change, often also by using violence and terrorism. The structures of foreign extremist organisations acting from within Germany thereby oppose the concept of international understanding.

In Germany, these organisations do not carry out any terrorist activities at the moment. However, they use Germany as a place from which to support their organisations at home and these organisations' violent actions through propaganda, often also by supplying money, material and newly recruited combatants. This makes them a threat to the external interests of the Federal Republic of Germany. Especially during clashes between followers of hostile extremist camps, by crimes during gatherings and by attacks on institutions of the (home) country that they fight against, Germany's internal security is at risk as well. PKK, the Marxist-Leninist Turkish Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), the right-wing extremist Turkish Ülkücü movement as well as secular Palestinian extremists are currently of particular importance in this context.

In Turkey, **PKK** continues to commit terrorist attacks, such as the suicide attack in front of the Turkish Interior Ministry in Ankara on 1 October 2023

during which both attackers died. In contrast, in the rest of Europe, PKK has endeavoured for years to cultivate a largely non-violent image. Nonetheless, public events frequently spark violent confrontations with the police or with nationalists or right-wing extremists of Turkish origin. The organisation is in a position to use violence in Germany at least sporadically if it considers this necessary. Moreover, the organisation tends to at least tolerate criminal and violent offences committed by its young followers.

Through its **annual fundraising campaign** (“kampanya”) in 2023, PKK raised an estimated amount of between 16 and 17 million euros in Germany alone, more or less equalling the sum of the previous year. A large number of **gatherings**, which are of considerable importance to the party, have again taken place in Germany in 2023. Such events enable the organisation to spread its propaganda but also to recruit new followers and sometimes to raise funds as well. In addition to numerous smaller events, there were also large-scale events, such as the central Newroz celebrations in Frankfurt am Main with up to 35,000 participants and the International Kurdish Cultural Festival, also in Frankfurt am Main, with up to 12,000 participants.

The **pressure of investigation and prosecution** by law enforcement agencies on PKK officials in Germany remains high. In 2023 too, several PKK leaders were sentenced to several years in prison for their support or membership of the foreign terrorist organisation PKK. Further criminal proceedings against senior officials are currently underway.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing violent clashes with Turkish security forces in the Kurdish settlement areas, PKK continues to carry out activities to **recruit** mainly young followers from Germany and Europe **for the armed struggle**. Since BfV began to keep statistical records in 2013, more than 300 individuals have left Germany for the Kurdish settlement areas to join PKK’s combat units, among others. 41 of these individuals have died there and around 160 individuals have returned to Germany by now. This proves that individuals recruited in Germany, including German nationals, receive military training and are deployed in combat areas abroad.

DHKP-C still tries to stage terrorist attacks in Turkey. For example, four DHKP-C members who were trying to illegally cross the Greek-Turkish border were killed in a shootout with Turkish security forces on 30 October 2023. DHKP-C called the killed individuals “martyrs” and DHKP-C fighters and indirectly confirmed the attack plans. One of the individuals killed had stayed in Germany as a DHKP-C official for many years and had also received a prison sentence in our country.

After the **arrests of the leaders of DHKP-C in Germany as well as of two former DHKP-C area leaders** in Germany in May 2022, criminal proceedings began before the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court on 14 June 2023. Furthermore, **another regional DHKP-C official was arrested** on 9 February 2023; he has been on trial before the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court since 19 September 2023. In both cases, the defendants are charged with membership of the foreign terrorist organisation DHKP-C. As a response to the arrests, DHKP-C has started a permanent campaign demanding the release of its imprisoned members. In this context, three junior officials began an unlimited hunger strike in spring 2023 lasting the entire year.

In the field of foreign extremism in Germany, **antisemitism** plays a relevant role mainly in Turkish right-wing extremism and among secular extremist Palestinians. For Turkish right-wing extremists, antisemitism is a predominant part of their ideology; among secular Palestinian extremists, antisemitic agitation mainly occurs against the backdrop of the territorial conflict with Israel. In other foreign extremist structures, however, antisemitism is not a key ideological factor – often simply due to the lack of regional, religious or political links. Nonetheless, on occasions, Turkish left-wing extremists also express anti-Israel sentiments; these, however, do not primarily focus on religion and ethnicity but on solidarity with the Palestinians and the rejection of the alleged “imperialist” and “capitalist” State of Israel.

The HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and Israel’s subsequent military action against terrorist structures in the Gaza Strip also had an impact on the security situation in Germany. Followers of extremist

Palestinian organisations as well as Turkish left-wing and right-wing extremists organised pro-Palestinian gatherings or participated in them. Via social media, they mobilised for protests and spread propaganda. In this context, there have been repeated cases of anti-Israel and sometimes also antisemitic statements and depictions.

During the protests and gatherings after the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel and concerning the war in the Gaza Strip, the **MLKP youth organisation Young Struggle (YS)** was one of the most active extremist protagonists regarding mobilisation for, organisation of and participation in pro-Palestinian gatherings and the establishment of links between different spectra.

Especially the non-organised part of the Turkish right-wing extremist **Ülkücü scene** came to notice in this context because they took a clearly pro-Palestinian position. This brought to light the **antisemitism in Turkish right-wing extremism**; the **terror of HAMAS was justified** and at the same time **Israel's right to exist was denied**. In addition to calls to boycott Israeli companies and goods produced in Israel and the mobilisation for or participation in pro-Palestinian rallies, the scene also raised funds for the Gaza Strip as well as for the organisation of demonstrations in Germany.

The main player among the secular extremist **Palestinian organisations** active in Germany is the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)**, which was founded in 1967. This organisation does not publicly carry out activities under its name in Germany but, through its officials or members, it organises propaganda actions and gatherings and/or mobilises for them. Since 2002, PFLP has been listed by the EU as a terrorist organisation. PFLP denies Israel's right to exist and openly propagates the armed struggle against the Jewish state. Its antisemitic agitation is strongly influenced by anti-Zionism.

In addition, there are individuals in Germany with links to Palestinian extremism who express antisemitic or anti-Israel views or who engage in antisemitic or anti-Israel activities but who cannot be identified as members of PFLP or other extremist Palestinian organisations. This spectrum has repeatedly

spread calls for violence against Jews on social media. This scene's potential for mobilisation in Germany, also with regard to individuals without fixed organisational affiliations, has become apparent time and again during protest rallies in the context of annual occasions such as the "al-Quds Day"²⁴, the "Nakba Day"²⁵ or the "Day of the Palestinian Prisoners", but also in the context of spontaneous reactions to current political events in the Middle East such as, most recently, the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. During protest rallies, there have repeatedly been antisemitic or anti-Israel statements or depictions and the atmosphere among the participants is often aggressive, again and again culminating in physical confrontations and in attacks on journalists or the police.

On 2 November 2023, the Federal Minister of the Interior and Community imposed a ban on the activities of the international **Samidoun network in Germany**. The sub-organisation Samidoun Germany, which also operated under the names of HIRAK – Palestinian Youth Mobilization Jugendbewegung (Germany) and Hirak e.V., was banned and dissolved. The ban includes the public appearance under the name of Samidoun and undertaking activities on behalf of Samidoun. The social media channels, which were important for propaganda and mobilisation, were deactivated and/or blocked in Germany. By that order, the use of Samidoun's symbols was also prohibited, including the slogan *"From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free"*. Various protagonists from the fields of German and Turkish left-wing extremism subsequently expressed their solidarity with Samidoun. Just a few hours after the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel had become known on 7 October 2023, Samidoun welcomed the attack, downplayed the terror against civilians as "resistance" and celebrated it by distributing sweets in Berlin. This continued in the weeks that followed until the ban was imposed in early November. Since the ban, no relevant activities carried out by Samidoun itself under this name have become publicly known in Germany.

24 "Al-Quds" is the Arabic name of Jerusalem. The "al-Quds Day" always takes place at the end of Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting.

25 Since 2004, the "Nakba Day" has taken place every year on 15 May. On this day, Palestinians and their supporters all over the world commemorate the flight and expulsion from the former British Mandate of Palestine in 1948 and 1949. The Arabic term "Nakba" means "catastrophe".

The 2023 Report on the Protection of the Constitution is the first edition of this report to mention the **BDS movement (“Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions”)** as a **suspected extremist threat**. BDS has links to secular Palestinian extremism through its anti-Israel attitude and relevant statements of its associated structures and followers. With its international campaign, BDS calls for a complete economic boycott, the withdrawal of investment capital as well as for sanctions against the State of Israel. In the English original of the 2005 founding document “BDS Call”, the first of three key demands is to end the occupation of “all Arab lands” which, in this context, is to be understood as **the end of Israel’s existence as a state**. Such demands are regularly expressed during public gatherings, also in Germany, in which groups close to BDS take part.

Intelligence activities, espionage, cyber attacks and other activities carried out on behalf of a foreign power

Due in part to its role in the EU, NATO and other international organisations, Germany is of special interest to other countries and continues to be a central target of political espionage. Upheaval in world politics, economic shifts and innovations, the paradigm change in security and defence policy resulting from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and China's much more aggressive pursuit of its interests all led in the reporting year to greater attention by government and the public to the activities of foreign intelligence services.

Foreign powers put their intelligence agencies to work spying in and on Germany. In addition, other illegitimate or illegal methods and means are used not only to gather information, but also to exert influence, monitor or persecute opposition figures (transnational repression²⁶) and explore possible targets for sabotage. Such spying activities rely on human sources as well as cyber attacks and other technology for gathering intelligence, such as surveillance of wireless communications. These intelligence activities pose a serious threat to Germany and German interests. Foreign intelligence services operating in Germany to spy on and infiltrate opposition groups from third countries create additional threats not only in the form of state-sponsored terrorism which endanger the life and well-being of people seeking protection here. What is more, cyber attacks and espionage cause serious damage to businesses, industry and the economy as a whole every year.

The **main actors** in espionage targeted at Germany, cyber attacks directed by intelligence services, proliferation and influence operations are – with differing areas of focus – the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Turkey. However, Germany's counter-intelligence and cyber defence efforts encompass illegal intelligence

26 Transnational repression refers to punitive measures taken by governments outside of their national borders. These measures target dissidents living abroad and any other individuals viewed as enemies of the government in their country of origin. Typical forms of transnational repression include spying on dissidents and other regime opponents; threatening and persecuting opposition groups; and in extreme cases, engaging in state terrorism, with severe consequences for life and well-being.

activities by intelligence services from all other countries as well, in what is known as “360° processing”.

Germany’s counter-intelligence and cyber defence efforts continued to concentrate on **Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine**. The number of intelligence officers at Russian diplomatic missions in Germany has been reduced significantly in a series of steps over the past two years, and Russia continues to compensate for this loss of personnel. However, China’s comprehensive and strategic espionage and other undesirable forms of knowledge transfer too constitute a special challenge for Germany’s counter-intelligence and cyber defence.

Russia’s intelligence services are a serious potential threat. Their espionage activities in Germany focus, with varying levels of intensity, on government and administration, business and industry, research, technology and the military. In 2023, the Federal Government expelled additional Russian diplomats²⁷ in response to Russia’s war of aggression in violation of international law. Four of the five Russian consulates, where much of the **espionage** conducted by Russian intelligence services originated, were also required to close. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, more than 600 staff of Russian diplomatic missions in Europe have been expelled. Western sanctions, in particular measures to counter legal residencies, have led the Russian services to seek new ways of gathering intelligence in the medium and long term.

On 24 August 2023, the Federal Public Prosecutor General (GBA) charged two German nationals with high treason in the Berlin Higher Regional Court chamber for matters of state security. They were suspected of having given the Russian domestic intelligence service FSB sensitive information from Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND) (state secrets as referred to in section 93 of the German Criminal Code (*Strafgesetzbuch*, StGB)). The case illustrates Russia’s great interest in information which could be useful for carrying on its war in Ukraine.

²⁷ As early as April 2022 and in response to the Russian war of aggression, Germany expelled 40 Russian diplomats who were members of intelligence services.

Even before its war of aggression in Ukraine, Russia spread state **propaganda and disinformation** frequently and widely; since the war started, these activities have become even more intensive. In particular, state-sponsored and state-aligned actors increasingly use social media channels to share their own content and narratives with the broadest possible audience. In particular, the platform Telegram has been used increasingly and has become an important alternative to other social media for the distribution of disinformation. Along with state-sponsored actors, influencers and activists also played a greater role in amplifying propaganda and disinformation for Russia in 2023.

Russian cyber attacks, whether directed at individuals, organisations or government institutions, are primarily aimed at gaining a steady source of intelligence. In addition to such espionage, these attacks may also be used for sabotage, influence operations, disinformation or propaganda purposes. In their cyberspace operations, the Russian intelligence services rely on various groups of attackers, some of which are able to use highly sophisticated technology.

In 2023, a wide-ranging campaign of attacks on high-value political and business targets which exploited a previously undetected vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook provided evidence of the intensive interest of Russian intelligence services in gathering intelligence. Microsoft and other IT security service providers attribute the attacks to the threat actor **APT 28**. The campaign also attacked targets in Germany, including the headquarters of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD, Social Democratic Party of Germany).

China's intelligence services primarily serve the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These interests include the intention to advance by 2049 to the status of a world power at least equal to the U.S. and to realise the People's Republic aim of becoming a global leader (the "Chinese Dream"). The Chinese intelligence services are also involved in unlawful influence activities.

In terms of foreign policy and intelligence operations, China takes an offensive stance in pursuing its own interests. In the process, China seeks to influence the global order in line with the interests of its one-party system, thereby

relativising the foundations of the rule-based order as well. The demand of China's government and party leaders for information on supranational entities such as the EU and the UN as well as on Western alliance policy has grown in step with China's geopolitical ambitions. In Germany, Chinese intelligence services focus on the fields of government and public administration, the business sector, academic research, the technology sector and the military. They also monitor Chinese opposition groups and individuals. In the fields of government and public administration, information is gathered on Germany's policy positions related to the People's Republic. Chinese intelligence services are interested in information on the structure, armaments and training of the Bundeswehr, and in acquiring modern weapons technology from the German defence industry and high technology that also has military applications.

China uses a wide range of instruments to gather intelligence. Legal residencies at China's diplomatic missions in Germany mainly gather information from publicly accessible sources. Employees of the legal residencies also gather information by cultivating seemingly innocuous contacts. Current and former political and business decision-makers are particularly targeted as **potential contacts**.

China also focuses on applying civilian intelligence for military purposes. Key targets of **knowledge transfer** are emerging technologies (EMT) such as quantum computing technology, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, hypersonic technology and surveillance technology. Research collaboration, including with German universities and research institutions, is an important element of the Chinese state's system of technology and knowledge transfer, which is not always the result of intelligence activity. The Chinese state deliberately takes advantage of legal grey areas, insufficient risk awareness and the academic freedom guaranteed by Germany's constitution. Government scholarships, which are mainly granted by the **China Scholarship Council (CSC)**, are another way to obtain knowledge from Germany's research community.

In 2023, Germany remained one of the most important targets of Chinese investment in Europe. Foreign **direct investment** enables China to gain access legally to technologies, know-how and intellectual property.

China needs a favourable environment abroad in order to achieve the goals set by the CCP. With this in mind, China seeks out influential political figures to “lobby” on behalf of Chinese interests. Chinese agencies also spread **dis-information** to portray CCP policies in a positive light and to emphasise the alleged superiority of the Chinese model of order.

A series of highly sophisticated **cyber attacks** was detected starting in early 2023 which targeted various IT service providers whose main area of operations is government networks. It can be assumed that the attacks were not aimed at the service providers themselves, but were instead intended to go through their infrastructure to penetrate the networks of their clients (supply chain attacks). The threat actors APT 15 and APT 31 were notable for their increasingly complex techniques and the impressive development of their tools of attack. To disguise their activities as thoroughly as possible, cyber attackers infiltrate growing numbers of terminal devices such as home routers and smart TVs, which are then hijacked to launch attack campaigns.

Intelligence activities of the **Islamic Republic of Iran** are driven by the political situation in the Middle East as well as the demonstration and protest movement within the nation itself. One priority of Iran’s intelligence activities is opposition groups and individuals within and outside of Iran. Those in power in Iran believe that these opposition groups threaten the continued existence of the regime.

Iran’s intelligence services also use **state-sponsored terrorism** to achieve their goals. These goals are primarily to intimidate and neutralise opposition members and to punish those viewed as “traitors” or “turncoats”. Spying by Iranian intelligence services often aids in preparing state-sponsored terrorist activities, which include kidnapping or even assassinating their targets.

Apart from the U.S., Iran regards the State of Israel in particular, its representatives and prominent supporters as its enemies. In the early hours of 18 November 2022, a school near the synagogue in Bochum, North Rhine-Westphalia, was damaged by an incendiary device. The Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court found in its judgment of 19 December 2023 that the attack was planned by an “Iranian state agency”. This incident offers evidence that (pro-) Jewish and (pro-) Israel interests and facilities in Germany too are the focus of Iranian activities.

In 2023, **Iranian cyber espionage** in Germany mainly focused on the Iranian exile community in this country. Cyber attacks were characterised by sophisticated social engineering²⁸ and the use of freely available malware that had been modified for its specific purpose.

The **Turkish intelligence services** play a key role in the Turkish government apparatus. They spy on organisations and individuals in Germany which oppose or are thought to oppose the Turkish government. Their intelligence-gathering focuses above all on organisations which Turkey classifies as extremist or terrorist. Turkish organisations also conduct activities to influence communities of Turkish origin in Germany; these activities can have an impact on decision-making or the development of informed political opinion in Germany. The largest state- or government-aligned interest group involved in exerting such influence is the Union Internationaler Demokraten (UID, Union of International Democrats), which was founded in 2004 and has its headquarters in Cologne, North Rhine-Westphalia. The UID has a significant number of followers, and they were a significant factor in the Turkish parliamentary and presidential elections in 2023.

The activities by the countries of North Africa and the Middle East to gather intelligence in Germany are a focus of **“360° processing”**. The intelligence services of these countries seek to spy on opposition figures in Germany and discredit them as extremists, in part by using means of transnational repression. On 31 August 2023, the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court convicted a

28 Social engineering is a method for manipulating people to act in a certain (security-critical) way. It is used to prepare the way for further activities, such as cyber attacks or recruitment attempts by foreign intelligence services.

Moroccan national in the service of Moroccan intelligence services of spying on an opposition group in Germany.

BfV keeps an eye on countries that could potentially use **CBRN weapons**²⁹ in an armed conflict or that threaten to use such weapons to achieve their political aims.

Since late February 2022, in response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has imposed 13 packages of sanctions against Russia which include extensive economic sanctions, lists of sanctioned individuals and institutions, and lists of sanctioned goods. The most important element of the sanctions is the ban on supplying dual-use goods.³⁰ In 2023, BfV verified a significant increase in factual indications of **attempts to procure proliferation-relevant goods which involved Russian intelligence services** and were specifically related to Germany. Along with dual-use goods for CBRN weapons and military space programmes, Russia increasingly sought to procure goods related to quantum computing technology and maritime navigation.

China is working hard to become a world leader, also by utilising German research in the field of emerging technologies. Much of China's procurement activity is not subject to sanctions, international restrictions or export limits. As a result, German high-tech is vulnerable to acquisition by other countries. Emerging technologies of a dual-use nature in particular have the potential to influence future military conflicts to a degree similar to that of weapons of mass destruction.

BfV's **prevention** efforts help to ensure that private business and industry, the research community, and politicians, political organisations and government administration can protect themselves against information-gathering, illegal transfer of knowledge and technology, sabotage and extremist and terrorist threats. BfV's efforts include publishing extensive information on a range of subjects in many different formats and at regular intervals. Again in 2023,

29 CBRN stands for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

30 Dual-use goods are those that could be used for both civilian and military purposes.

BfV's prevention efforts largely focused on Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting threats to companies and research institutions, among others; these efforts also focused on hostile spying and restrictions by Chinese state entities.

Security of classified information and counter-sabotage

Security of classified material serves to protect information which is defined by a state authority as classified material.³¹ Protection against sabotage is intended to keep vital and defence-essential facilities safe against sabotage by “insiders”.

Security clearance checks in accordance with the Act on Prerequisites and Procedures for Security Clearance Checks Undertaken by the Federal Government (Security Clearance Check Act (*Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz*, SÜG)) are a crucial element of personnel security and counter-sabotage. Such checks determine whether an individual is sufficiently reliable to work in a security-sensitive position.

The SÜG defines the cases in which a security clearance check is necessary. In the context of personnel security, checks must be conducted if an individual has actual or potential access to material classified VS-VERTRAULICH (confidential) or above. In order to prevent sabotage, checks are necessary if the individual works in a security-sensitive area of a vital or defence-essential facility.

Whether a security clearance check on an individual is necessary and whether the person represents a security risk is determined by the public authority employer or, if the person in question is employed by a private enterprise, by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action. In order to facilitate this process, BfV carries out the measures for the respective security clearance check required under section 12 of the SÜG and in doing so provides an important service to these stakeholders.

Last year, BfV contributed to 80,431 security clearance checks related to the security of classified information and protection against sabotage. The number of security clearance checks remains at a high level. BfV has responded to this situation by designing, testing and introducing largely digital working processes.

31 Classified material is defined as sensitive facts, objects or intelligence, regardless of the forms these take, which must be kept secret in the public interest, in particular to protect the welfare of the country as a whole or of one of the federal states.

A similar number of security clearance checks is conducted for employees of public authorities and private enterprises.

In 2023, 13,724 basic security checks, 37,196 extended security checks and 2,719 extended security checks including security investigations were carried out in connection with the security of classified information. Another 9,125 checks were completed in connection with counter-sabotage, along with 17,667 updates of security checks.

The Scientology organisation (SO)

The Scientology organisation (SO) seeks to establish a global society based on Scientology. The organisation continues to count about 3,600 members in Germany, as it has since 2021.

The organisation's ideology is strictly based on the writings of its founder and long-time leader Lafayette Ron Hubbard (1911–1986), who invented a method he called “technology”, “dianetics” and “Scientology”. This method is intended to create the perfect human, called “clear” or “non-aberrated”. In Hubbard's teachings, people who are not “clear” are to be denied fundamental rights and human dignity. The SO sees itself as a ruling elite that should reign over the rest of humanity. This world view is incompatible with the principle of democracy enshrined in Germany's constitution, the Basic Law.

Scientology seeks to attain its envisaged social order via a long-term strategy of expansion, by increasing the organisation's revenues and by fighting its critics. The SO presents itself to the outside world as an apolitical religious community.

In 2023, the entire federal territory saw regular demonstrations, information stands and distribution of promotional material by the SO as well as its sub- and cover organisations. The online course and seminar offerings, including webinars, online briefings and other online events, established during the COVID-19 pandemic continue to be provided.

The SO says that it is continuing its “Golden Age of Admin” campaign, which U.S. Scientology leader David Miscavige announced in 2022. The campaign is part of the SO's strategy of expansion.

Again in 2023, the SO cover organisation The Way to Happiness distributed its booklet “Der Weg zum Glücklichein” (The Way to Happiness) at distribution events throughout Germany. Additionally, materials specifically designed for

children were again distributed, a reflection of the organisation's growing efforts to influence children.

Publication data

Published by

Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community
Alt-Moabit 140
10557 Berlin

Editorial team

Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV)
1B7: Central Reporting

Design and printing

Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
Media design and print
in the ServiCenter I

English translation

Language Services Division, Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community
Language Services, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV)

The brief summary of the 2023 Report on the Protection of the Constitution:
Facts and Trends is also available on the Internet at
www.verfassungsschutz.de

This brochure has been published as part of the public information efforts of the Federal Government. It is available free of charge and is not for sale. It may not be used by any political party, candidate or campaign workers during an election campaign for purposes of campaign advertising.

the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are employed in the public sector has increased by 1.5 million, from 2.5 million in 1980 to 4 million in 1998. The public sector has also become an important employer of women, with 5.5 million women employed in the public sector in 1998, compared with 4.5 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people with disabilities, with 1.5 million people with disabilities employed in the public sector in 1998, compared with 1 million in 1980.

The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are over 50 years of age. In 1998, 1.5 million people over 50 years of age were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are under 25 years of age. In 1998, 1.5 million people under 25 years of age were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980.

The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from ethnic minority groups. In 1998, 1.5 million people from ethnic minority groups were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the Irish Republic. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the Irish Republic were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980.

The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the Scottish Highlands and Islands. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the Scottish Highlands and Islands were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the Welsh Mountains. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the Welsh Mountains were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980.

The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the Northern Ireland. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the Northern Ireland were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the Republic of Ireland. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the Republic of Ireland were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980.

The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the Channel Islands. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the Channel Islands were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the Isle of Man. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the Isle of Man were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980.

The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the Crown Dependencies. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the Crown Dependencies were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the Overseas Territories. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the Overseas Territories were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980.

The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the United Kingdom. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the United Kingdom were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the European Union. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the European Union were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980.

The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the rest of the world. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the rest of the world were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the United Kingdom. In 1998, 1.5 million people from the United Kingdom were employed in the public sector, compared with 1 million in 1980.