/liberty/ - Liberty

It depends how you define free will. But individualism just needs individual agency. Are the cells in your brain able to reason while making decisions in regards to external stimuli on behalf of itself? Yes, then individualism makes sense. Collectivism just doesn't make sense unless we're something like ants which are completely instinct driven. Ants have no agency, very few animals do. They're not able to reason as far as we know. Now ultimately the limbic system chooses for us but we're able to juggle around ideas and reason them.

And it really comes down to this, I can survive without the group or another group, it doesn't make sense for the survival of my "consciousness" to sacrifice myself on behalf of the collective.

There's no `statism.`

I'm a compatibilitist. I believe in determinism AND free will.

>>11975

>>11982

>>11977

>>11969

>>11959

Ought implies can

>>11984

What's your point?

>>11984

Interesting. What's your point, though?

>>11959

Compatiblism.

All matter behaves deterministically, but chaotically. The chaotic systems are so sensitive to initial conditions that they can never be predicted with perfect accuracy. This is known as randomness. It's still deterministic (in that effect follows necessarily from cause), but there is no chance for prediction.

Free will–the selection between possible courses of action–is just one of the functions of certain configurations of matter. Choice is not the ability to exceed the limits of reality; it is merely an event which occurs within it.

>>11997

I do not mean to suggest that all cause-effect relationships are entirely unpredictable; only that some measure of chaos exists at some level in all systems.

Also, to clarify; the idea of sensitivity leading to unpredictability lies in the physical reality of uncertainty; the initial conditions cannot be known with perfect accuracy.

Sage because this should have been in my last post.

As someone converting to thebone true Christian faith, free will is areauirement to keep god from being a massive dick.

>>11959

It's an axiom you idiots

>>12007

axioms are wrong when they don't lead to truths

>>11997

This is pretty much my opinion, too.

>>12009

>muh truth that can get rid of axiom

prove it faggit

>>12012

An axiom is useless if it doesn't lead to truthful data and conclusions.

>>12031

Oh look, it's this retard again.

>>12023

>muh circular argument

stay in the rathole.

Have you prayed to you space alien overlords today? Pretty sure you'll be dead if you don't mate.

>>12031

>implying I'm an ancap

Unlike you morons I don't buy into the capitalism vs socialism meme.

>>12038

No, it's tautology, you idiot. If an axiom doesn't give anything of use it is useless by definition. Circular logic is A is true because B is true; B is true because A is true. It's not the same, this is A is defined by B so B describes A. But I can see how it'd be over your small head.

>>12042

An axiom or postulate is a premise or starting point of reasoning. As classically conceived, an axiom is a premise so evident as to be accepted as true without controversy.

In rhetoric, a tautology (from Greek ταὐτός, "the same" and λόγος, "word/idea") is a logical argument constructed in such a way, generally by repeating the same concept or assertion using different phrasing or terminology, that the proposition as stated is logically irrefutable, while obscuring the lack of evidence or valid reasoning supporting the stated conclusion.

You're the idiot here. Free Will is inherently necessary to be able to take any decisions at all. Without it, nothing is possible. It's not a tautology, it's an axiom.

>capitalism vs socialism meme

It's not a meme.

>>12048

I read this in Red's voice.

>>12048

>DURR MUH DETERMINISM

It's ridiculously easy to disprove this.

Okay, hypothetical.

You have infinite computing power and full knowledge of all universal constants and initial conditions. You should be able to predict anything, right?

Okay, predict whether a light will be on. I want you to signal your answer by using your own light.

1. You have to leave your light alone for an hour, if your light is on at that point it means you're predicting the other light will be on, if your light is off that means you're predicting the other light will be off

2. The other light is attached to a motion sensor pointed at your light. It is set to turn off if your light is on and turn on if your light is off.

You can not predict this outcome accurately, so fuck your determinism.

>>12051

and you can't move anything around in the room and you have no objects to block light or w/e

>>12051

and you only have a switch so the light you change will remain in its state for the hour

>>12055

You are the sum of those action potentials. Why do you need to be some kind of metaphysical being in order to be considered to exist and exert your will? Whatever processes make up my brain and whether or not we can explain them are irrelevant; what's important is that my brain is what's making decisions.

>>12051

>>12052

>>12053

>It is set to turn off if your light is on and turn on if your light is off.

In other words, you can't make a prediction on whether the other light is on or off because your means of communication are flawed. That's not a point against determinism.

>>12066

>your means of communication are flawed.

How is the means of communication flawed?

You need to give me a binary answer, there's 2 possibilities you can predict and 2 ways you can signal that prediction. The means of communication are sufficient to signal the 2 possibilities.

>>12048

Nigga what?

An axiom is like saying 1+1=2.

Obviously it won't work if you change the definition of addition to multiplication, you dip.

The thing is, it is true that in the reality we percieve 1+1=2. Hence addition is the correct answer.

Now you keep asking "muh why"

The thing is, when a logical system (or any system, for any system based on reality is logical) starts regressing between two points, it means that you have reached an immutable truth. That is an axiom. You asking why all the time serves no purpose.

A machine is not alive. It does not understand rights. It does not have a consciousness. Neither do animals. Hence, they have no free will. They are entirely subsurvient to their own biology, in the case of animals, theor bodies, and for machines, their cpus or whatever.

"muh scientifically proven"

just because there's an underlying biological system under the process does not mean the system does not possess of an entity that can understand itself.

It's like the next stage: the biological components evolve to a level where they can emulate and, in effect, modify themselves, the way they wish, and not necessarily the way their biology would intend.

>>12065

>Why do you need to be some kind of metaphysical being in order to be considered to exist and exert your will?

You have will, it's just not free. It's causal. The summation of those action potentials are beyond your will. In fact when you try to feel a certain way that is a recursive function of your biology telling you to feel that way.

>>12077

>An axiom is like saying 1+1=2.

No, that's an expression.

An axiom looks more like:

a+b=b+a

>Now you keep asking "muh why"

No I don't.

>when a logical system (or any system, for any system based on reality is logical) starts regressing between two points, it means that you have reached an immutable truth.

No, when evidence converges you're approaching the facts.

>That is an axiom.

No that's the conclusion from well chosen axioms if it is true.

>A machine is not alive.

Life is a set of relatively arbitrary criteria.

>It does not understand rights.

So don't most people actually. But something doesn't have to be alive to have understanding as far as we know.

>It does not have a consciousness.

As far as we know but the Chinese Room thought experiment cuts both ways. Just because people around me passed the Turning test I cannot be sure they are actually conscious or just behaving as if have consciousness but actually don't, the system is just very convincing. Human brains could differ enough that some people aren't truly conscious just appear that way. And we'd never be able to tell.

>They are entirely subsurvient to their own biology

So are we as humans, we are biological machines who are capable of rationality. But that rationality is run on a biological system, it is subservient to it.

>just because there's an underlying biological system under the process does not mean the system does not possess of an entity that can understand itself.

Nowhere do I argue this. And a system being able to understand itself doesn't mean it had the choice of that understanding.

>>12072

They are insufficient to signal the current state, because the current state changes whenever you signal it. It's like asking someone to point at the exact spot a driving car is standing, but not allowing him to move his finger after he did it. There is no way he can tell you where the car is with this means of communication.

>>11997

All matter behave probabilistically and chaotically.

>>12089

>probabilistically

Meaning that due to uncertainty with regards to the initial conditions of the chaotic system, it must be modeled statistically, yes.

>>12073

>michio cuckoo

>>12085

>They are insufficient to signal the current state, because the current state changes whenever you signal it.

How do you know the current state changes, did you run this experiment already?

>>12092

>How do you know the current state changes, did you run this experiment already?

Are you dense? This is from your original post:

>You have infinite computing power and full knowledge of all universal constants and initial conditions.

Unless you somehow introduce magic into it, I know exactly how the mechanism works.

>>12106

>Unless you somehow introduce magic into it, I know exactly how the mechanism works.

You're just assuming you won't be able to make an accurate prediction without having actually run such a test yourself, even when you have infinite computing power etc.? I guess you've just confessed you don't believe in determinism.

Checkmate.

>>11992

>>11995

I forgot you're philosophically illiterate

>>12112

>You're just assuming you won't be able to make an accurate prediction

I'm not assuming this at all. I can make this prediction perfectly well, I just can't communicate my prediction to outsiders. That's two different problems.

>I guess you've just confessed you don't believe in determinism.

>Checkmate.

Put the damn pseudo-intellectualism away, you smug motherfucker.

>>12115

Fuck off, you lazy cunt.

>>12117

>>12117

>I can make this prediction perfectly well, I just can't communicate my prediction to outsiders. That's two different problems.

fam, pls

>given infinite super computer

>given full knowledge of all universal constants

>given full knowledge of all initial conditions

>can't accurately predict, with 2 signals, the two potential outcomes

How could 2 signals be insufficient for 2 outcomes?

If the British are coming by sea or by land, I don't need to plan three signals for my fellow colonists.

If I need to tell the artillery to either strike position A or B based on which is a better target presently, two signals should be sufficient.

If I need to tell someone I either have XY chromosomes or XX chromosomes, 2 signals should be sufficient.

>>12112

>How could 2 signals be insufficient for 2 outcomes?

>If the British are coming by sea or by land, I don't need to plan three signals for my fellow colonists.

The British will be coming by sea or by land. You can either signal your fellow patriots "JonTron" or "banana". What's that? They won't know what you're talking about? Looks like you can't accurately predict how the British will arrive.

Determinists: -1

Britbongs: 1

Americans: 0

>If I need to tell the artillery to either strike position A or B based on which is a better target presently, two signals should be sufficient.

The artillery then changes the position it will strike because it knows when you tell the IS where it will strike. Humans somehow react to your choices, therefore determinists can suck dick.

Determinists: -2

Americans: 1

>If I need to tell someone I either have XY chromosomes or XX chromosomes, 2 signals should be sufficient.

Your gender changes whenever you show people your titties or your peenus. Somehow, this means it's impossible for you to know your own gender, therefore, determinists are wrong and tumblr is right.

Determinists: -3

Americans: 0

>>12082

>greentexted everything except the part where I tell him that he is changing the definition of the term itself.

nice shilling.

To me, it looks like your life is determined. Your viewpoint is right in the context of your (and only your) life because you are an idiot who only spouts memorized sentences.

>>12115

Not just philosophically.

>>12130

>The British will be coming by sea or by land. You can either signal your fellow patriots "JonTron" or "banana". What's that? They won't know what you're talking about? Looks like you can't accurately predict how the British will arrive.

That would be sufficient if they knew JonTron was code for "sea" and banana was code for "land."

:^)

>>12144

So whether determinism is right or not depends on whether true patriots understand you?

>>12162

I'm not quite sure I can determine that

>>11984

You're meaning this as a consequentialist argument against incompatibilism, right?

>>12130

>If I need to tell someone I either have XY chromosomes or XX chromosomes

What if you have Klinefelter's syndrome?

>>12188

>I don't care at all, guys. Dis so good 8-)

If I wanted to stop caring, I'd become a stoner. No thanks.

Here's my biggest problem with how these discussions typically go: Neither side ever seems to actually give a consistent, working definition of free will. To me, at least, this seems like a natural starting point and a very important thing to do. Otherwise, it just devolves into "No, free will obviously doesn't exist because x condition isn't satisfied", and it becomes difficult (for me, at least) to form an argument because I'm not even really sure what the "success state" is supposed to be. They seem to refer to "free will" as this nebulous entity that mustn't interact with the universe in any way except to make decisions by some phantom process, because otherwise it's not free will.

Personally, although I'm not a determinist myself (the way it's always been taught to me up to this point is that randomness does exist, though I suppose it's possible I'm getting a simplified version due to still being undergrad), I agree with the compatibalist view that randomness isn't even a necessary component for free will in the first place. I don't even think it's really all that difficult to achieve: I just see free will as being what happens when a conscious, thinking mind acts free of coercion. I really don't see how it makes any difference that we're able to explain the biological mechanisms behind that process.

>>12082

>that is a recursive function of your biology telling you to feel that way.

But again, I am my biology. That, to me, just sounds like you're saying "a recursive function of you telling you to feel that way".

>>12189

>implying stoners don't think about free will

I enjoy injecting the marijuanas, anon, and I happen to find this a fairly important/interesting topic as far as philosophy goes. Granted, the discourse of stoners on the topic is rarely profound in any sense, but I'm certain that "dude, you ever think about free will, man?" has been said around many-a bong.

>>12184

there's a few disorders, not relevant to 99% of people.

>>12188

What if I'm predetermined to think you're full of shit, if you're right I guess that means I can just ignore you :^^^^^)

>>12190

>But again, I am my biology.

But biology is not under the direct control of conscious will. Rather the will is under direct control of biology which is chemistry and physics of biomolecular architectures. Consciousness is the manifestation of complex neuronal biology but it doesn't have direct control over its mechanisms rather the mechanisms are what produce and control it. Thus will isn't free but constrained to the outputs of the functions of those mechanisms. As said previously you don't have control over when an neuron fires off, that is dependent on the voltage from the concentration gradient. Unless we have full control of our parts consciously there is no such thing as free will. The will isn't free but bounded to mechanisms we cannot fully control.

>>12195

But like I've been saying, my will is just the sum total of a portion of those biological processes. It is a component of the whole, and it isn't being coerced by some sort of outside force. "I" don't have control over the nuerons flying off because I am the neurons flying off. In other words, if it's my biological processes that are running the show, I still consider that to be me running the show.

>The will isn't free but bounded to mechanisms we cannot fully control.

Yes, I do not have all options for human action available to me at any given moment, but that's just a matter of individuality – my brain is wired differently than someone else's, so naturally it/I decide to do different things. By that logic, it seems like your definition of "free will" would be "everyone is exactly the same and can make any decision at any time", which doesn't really even sound all that desirable.

>>12197

> "I" don't have control over the nuerons flying off because I am the neurons flying off. In other words, if it's my biological processes that are running the show, I still consider that to be me running the show.

Is the current runtime the same as the components it runs on? No, same here. Your consciousness is the manifestation of these biological components, not the electrical components themselves. However just as the runtime is dependent on the specific components it runs on so does the consciousness. And while a computer can have greater control over its components certain things are fixed due to the constraints of the architecture and programming. To control a gate you may need to do a certain thing, there is no way to control the gate without going though that. Kinda like to feel happy it may be necessary to smile, you can't tell your neurons directly to flood dopamine.

Now your neurons are running you, you don't run them.

>By that logic, it seems like your definition of "free will" would be "everyone is exactly the same and can make any decision at any time", which doesn't really even sound all that desirable.

It's not a matter of desirable or not. Your brain computes inputs and you have very little direct control over how it does that, it just presents it to you like you made the decision but your decision was made for you before your consciousnesses was made aware of it.

This is all biology but it's not helpful to lump everything under biology when we're looking at the specific biological breakdown.

>>12198

I think you're ascribing too much importance to consciousness. It's just an emergent property of those neurons acting together in a certain way, and I'm still not sure if I understand your argument for treating the two as separate entities. Consciousness is a property of my brain, and my brain is making the decisions. Are you trying to argue that my brain isn't part of me? If so, why is that the case?

>Kinda like to feel happy it may be necessary to smile, you can't tell your neurons directly to flood dopamine.

Feelings aren't really the same as decisions, and in fact, I see taking a certain course of action in spite of your initial/instinctive feelings as being a component of free will. I can't tell myself to be happy, but I can keep doing something that I know is good for me even though it isn't making me happy right now. Hell, I can keep doing something I know is bad for me, too.

>This is all biology but it's not helpful to lump everything under biology when we're looking at the specific biological breakdown.

This just goes back to what I said earlier: We're clearly arguing with different definitions of "me" and "free will". The biology of my brain and body are very part of "me". In fact, they make up the whole thing. I see absolutely no reason to view a decision made by the system of my brain and my body as not being "mine", so long as I'm not being coerced by some other power.

>>12199

>Are you trying to argue that my brain isn't part of me? If so, why is that the case?

Because it may be possible for another consciousness to override yours. When someone loses brain function and is booted up again are they the exact same person or are they another consciousness with your previous runtime's memories so it would behave as though your consciousness didn't ever die and we would never know. I'm just wondering what really happens with temporary brain death and given what circumstances, all we know is it's a loss of any EEG signals. Being in a coma is not quite the same, there is activity.

> I see taking a certain course of action in spite of your initial/instinctive feelings as being a component of free will.

Exactly why consciousness is so key to all this. But the brain is complex so some systems making you feel a certain way won't necessarily override the decision making process. The human brain is incredibly partitioned. Part of the brain are competing for the decision, and there is a component that decides ultimately but all these parts are constrained to physical function. The fact is you have a delay between your decision being made and you being aware of it.

>We're clearly arguing with different definitions of "me" and "free will".

But some definitions better describe what is going on, the point is to get to definitions not that we agree with but that reflect reality better. I'm not saying that I'm there, not even close.

>The biology of my brain and body are very part of "me".

In some sense, I'd say they make and enable you more than they are you. You can't be without them of course, but as stated above you can only safely say you are the current runtime on this hardware. Suppose someone builds a conscious AI, what happens when we turn off and on the computer? Do we kill that runtime so that initial AI's consciousness goes blank and is overwritten by another with memories of the initial runtime going on as though nothing happened? Can this translate to humans in anyway?

>>12195

>Unless we have full control of our parts consciously there is no such thing as free will. The will isn't free but bounded to mechanisms we cannot fully control.

>full control

What a fucking strawman argument this is.

I could say you don't have full control because you can't

1. Invent an enzyme within your body that replicates telomeres at the end of your DNA

2. Manipulate your own DNA freely

3. Will that blood to one of your arms is constricted but not to the other

4. Stop your heart with a conscious act of will

DURR I GUESS IF YOU CAN'T DO ONE OF THOSE CONFIRMED NO FREE WILL

Consciousness/free will is an emergent property. If you're going to argue against free will saying "LOL YOU CANT WILL ONE OF YOUR NEURONS NOT TO FIRE" is retarded.

>>12207

The fact that will and consciousness are emergent properties with parts which you can't directly control the processes of means it's not freely up to you. These parts work together to produce consciousness, so if you can't directly control one part that is responsible for your thoughts then you aren't under full control of your thinking and your will isn't free. You pretty much further illustrated how the parts control you.

>>12190

>I just see free will as being what happens when a conscious, thinking mind acts free of coercion.

I think I can agree with that definition, for the most part.

>>12192

>What if I'm predetermined to think you're full of shit, if you're right I guess that means I can just ignore you :^^^^^)

Go ahead. I don't like this guy, either.

>>12195

We are those mechanisms. Maybe not the exact mechanism (we stop being ourselves just because some individual neurons are wired differently), but the mechanism as an approximiation. What else would you define as "you" if not the sum of your memories, thoughts, emotions and principles, moral or otherwise? All of these things are created by your brain, so it's fair to say that you "are" your brain.

With that said, I think an action can be attributed to a person if it is a result of this mechanism at work. If the mechanism is somehow disturbed, by being drugged for example, then the resulting action is not an act of free will. Coercion, on the other hand, causes free decisions. A robber who asks you to choose between your money or your life forces you to make a decision. That he had no right to do this does not change the fact that ultimately, you handing over your money was your decision.

>>12216

One more thing: I don't think you need to be conscious of your decision-making progress in order to "be" it. We don't make questions of identity dependent on consciousness in all other cases: Your car is your car, no matter whether it's conscious of that. I don't see why we should treat humans differently.

>>12236

>If you were predetermined not to like me why should I make any effort not to be an asshole? In fact you can't even blame me for being an asshole if I was pre-determined to be one. That's like getting mad at a robot because it does what you programmed it to do.

I'm so glad I'm a compatibilitist, not a "strong" determinist.

What does this argument solve?

In fact, I've only ever heard the determinism argument advanced by people who want to discount their personal failures and others successes.

The irony of the argument is that if determinism is correct (and it very well may be), the argument is pointless almost ipso facto.

>>12420

>I'm so glad I'm a compatibilitist, not a "strong" determinist.

Compatibilism is literally the least respectable position on free will.

Not to mention any real determinist wouldn't bother debating because debate presumes the possibility of choice and that people can choose a preferred state; there is no "wrong way" for causality to occur, hence no choice or preferred state.

>>12678

>What does this argument solve?

Free will is often regarded as the precondition for personal responsibility. You won't believe the kind of mental gymnastics law professors here in Germany go through in order to justify the existence of the criminal law even though the problem of free will is "unsolvable" (I have no idea why it should be unsolvable).

>In fact, I've only ever heard the determinism argument advanced by people who want to discount their personal failures and others successes.

Like leftists? Yeah, they seem to love it. I used to be a determinist, but only because I used to find it the most rational position. I never liked to use it to deny personal responsibility, though.

>>12682

>Compatibilism is literally the least respectable position on free will.

Fite me, cunt.