>Explain how you can have capitalism (property), socialism (redistribution) or any system of order (run by laws and commands) without government?
>What creates compliance and what maintains the status of compliance? What stops le Somalia meme from happening?
I'm bored, so I'll humor you even though I don't think you're open-minded enough to seriously consider my answer, maybe this will present new possibilities to the existing libertarians on this board.
Your question can, and should be boiled down to "how can anarcho-capitalism work in practice."
Some other interesting, and highly relevant questions to consider, is "what are the bulwarks to anarcho-capitalism?" The highly obvious ones are defense, private law, to a lesser degree private security (police), and to a lesser degree roads; also "durr wouldn't warlods take over?" Just about everyone understands how capitalism can provide them groceries, pencils, firearms, etc. so I'm not going to go into that.
I'm going to go straight for the hardest question. How do you have private law in an anarchist society. Lots of ways!
Method #1. Contracts. Whenever a friend comes into my home, they either electronically or physically on paper sign a basic contract that's a few rules. The contract then lists an arbitrator for all other disputes that might arise (a Dispute Resolution Organization, DRO, that specializes in criminal and civil suits.) If something happens that wasn't expected, like I go to show my new gun to my friend, he freaks out out and breaks my arm while disarming me, that would be an issue not expressly discussed on the contract, but it would still be settled with the arbitrator as per the contract, and they could rule on a common law basis, or whatever basis they want, but if it was a shitty basis people wouldn't opt into it (if they made their decisions on coin flips not many people would want them to solve their disputes.) Whenever you take a step on someone else's land, or they step on yours, you sign a contract with a listed arbitrator for all your disputes. You go for a drive, you use the road corporation's listed arbitrator in case of an accident.
Method #2. A voucher system. Let's say I start the "Basic Criminal Compliance DRO," shitty name, but that's besides the point. What I would do is give people unique IDs, electronic or physical, that verify them as having agreed to meet extremely basic social norms. For instance, my DRO would ensure people have signed a pledge to their community that they would pay certain fines to victims of crimes they commit, ennumerating what price would be paid for waht crimes. If they accidentally injure someone, they might pay $10,000 for pain and suffering + all the medical bills. If they commit murder, they could agree to pay 6,000,000 or 1000% of their annual income, whichever is more. Nobody would want to associate with an individual who has made NO pledge to comply with such basic laws, so you would be effectively exiled if you didn't. Here's where the voucher comes in. Since people have to pay sometimes large fines if they commit crimes, no one will want to associate with someone who doesn't have a third-party insurer vouching that "if this person fucks up, we'll pay for their crimes." Obviously basically no one has 6,000,000 or 1,000% of their actual annual income on hand, so voucher insurers would exist to vouch that "this person is not a murderer, and if they become one, we'll pony up for it." Vouchers that are very selective would have lower fees, but be harder to get into if you're black- I mean they would just be harder to get into. Vouchers that have low standards for issuing insurance would have high deductibles and premiums. If Jill murder 15 people with a katana like the god-forsaken weaboo she is, the only voucher she could get would be a prison hotel voucher who would try to circumvent some of their costs by letting her do what she was most productive at (if she was a programmer, they'd want to give her an opportunity to program, if she was a really good welder, they might build me a little workshop that would pay for itself in a few years, these prison hotels would compete to be the safest and most cost effective, and the goal would not be to keep these dangerous people in as much pain as possible but to keep them from committing crimes that cost lots of insurance money.)