>>17393
>collectively funded threat of retaliation.
Why does it have to be collectively funded? Why can't it just be funded?
>Which is impossible in an anarchist society unless you allow for free-riders
This is also false. Regional defense has historically been provided by private market actors.
https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Myth%20of%20National%20Defense,%20The%20Essays%20on%20the%20Theory%20and%20History%20of%20Security%20Production_3.pdf
>Blackmail would work out in the open
I don't think you know what "blackmail" means. Perhaps you're thinking of "ransom"? And see above about funding retaliation.
> there's also religion and bigotry/xenophobia which might be enough to create hatred and thus nukes
How do you go from hatred to nukes? You're completely ignoring the economics of developing the infrastructure necessary to carry out a nuclear program, and that's simply not sustainable without amicable global trade, which requires peaceful relationships.
>because people suck
And you think those people become better when you give some of them the power to violently coerce the rest of them?
>there have to be anti-tank rifles everywhere
Why? You really think there will be swarms of roving tanks all over the place? What are all these tank bandits doing with them? Mugging grandma? You think that's enough to keep a tank running? It'd only be worth it to attack fortified high-value targets. Nobody's knocking over the local convenience store with a goddamn tank. Banks, weapons depots, and maybe extremely wealthy business centers would do well to have a few on hand, but you don't need one at your house.
>It could be that it costs more to ban them, than just respond to their use, but in the cases where it isn't I don't know how the ban would be funded in an anarchist society
It will always cost more to ban them, because where you create a prohibition, you skew the supply curve, driving up the profit of trading in these goods and making illegal arms trade more lucrative. This requires ever more enforcement.
Plus, regional prohibition is antithetical to anarchy. If you're prohibiting certain weapons, you're restricting owners' property rights, which is not anarchy.
I don't know how many times I have to point out that if you can buy some kind of weapon, other people can too. And the notion that having a flamethrower gives you the run of the town when everybody else has their own guns is utterly preposterous. This isn't a comic book where some rich guy buys a big weapon and the whole town is on its knees; there are ruinous economic consequences to that kind of antisocial behavior.
>the wall of Trump with a door in the middle is more efficient than everyone doing their own checks
No, it is not. See: economics. You're talking about a monopolistic provider of a "service", which among other things means that they have no incentive to innovate or optimize. The market beats the state every time.
> how can suing only the big companies for their damages, be more effective than taxing all emissions at the same rate as the damage they cause?
Because you can't possibly know how much damage your neighbor is causing. The signal to noise ratio on those causal factors is too large. You'd need to look at the only statistically significant sources of emissions to make a difference. Automotive emissions are relatively small and dispersed over a large area, being partially filtered out by the ecosystem. Large factories' emissions are concentrated enough to make a difference.
There's also the fact that you keep responding to cited historical precedent of success with hypothetical worries, and are not considering the economics of the situation. A tax is a case of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. There's no incentive to adjust it to reflect real damages, and that funding being drawn through centralized politically controlled channels opens the floodgates for abuse and misallocation. Central management destroys the price mechanism and prevents market signals from efficiently distributing resources to resolve problems. And the EPA just levies a fine against offenders; if you're too small to buy political influence, you get hit with ruinous fees. If you're big enough to be writing the legislation, the fees are a slap on the wrist and you keep going. Plus, the fines don't go to pay the people actually harmed by pollution. Government regulation is counterproductive both in theory and historically.
>I mostly meant rights enforcement
And I addressed it accordingly. There are loads of ways of funding it privately. I don't remember who wrote about almost that exact concern, but I think it might have been David Friedman in The Machinery of Freedom.
http://daviddfriedman.com/The_Machinery_of_Freedom_.pdf
I'll have to go digging.