/liberty/ - Liberty

>>17861

Maybe Rand Paul would be too powerful

But in general if a bunch of libertarians were living on an island how would you suggest we defend ourselves from pirates

>what do

point out that if we had a million dollars we would have already built strong bunkers and coastal fort defenses

why is rand paul trying to bomb Libertarian Island?

The entire populace of Libertarian Island is heavily armed. Let the pirates come.

The average person of Libertarian Island owns an M29 Davey Crockett

>>17874

I guess there's the argument that if you're willing to extort others to defend the island- you should be willing to buy guns and shoot at assailants

But what if you would need a battleship? Crowdfunding?

>>17871

Would those be crowdfunded?

I suppose they could be paid for by landlords and treated as a utility. But should one landlord or person be able to say 'meh, other people should pay for my coastal defences' ?

Shouldn't they paid for by taxes so everyone necessarily contributes?

>>17876

>I suppose they could be paid for by landlords and treated as a utility. But should one landlord or person be able to say 'meh, other people should pay for my coastal defences' ?

Shouldn't they paid for by taxes so everyone necessarily contributes?

Step 1. Insure your land with a defense company that is large enough that if they screw you they'll lose money due to lost trust from everyone else

Step 2. They will provide defenses that are smaller than the maximum payout (let's just say like 300 million dollars) but less than what you'll pay in the long run (60 years-ish). So if you'll pay 30 million by the end of 60 years time, they have an incentive to provide as much defense as necessary up to 30 million, or drop you as a client as soon as the contract allows (every 5 years maybe? Or if the libertarians do something forbidden by contract like threatening to attack someone which they wouldn't do except in defense)

>>17877

That makes sense a little

Might need to think about it more

>>17876

Why would you need a battleship? If the goal is simply to defend your own land, not to subjugate others, then bearing firearms is sufficient.

low flat tax

>>17879

gee. i hope they don't have any long range heavy artillery.

>>17877

where would the money come from? is it just one person who feels like protecting his own land? do the other islanders benefit from this? if so, should they have to pay for it too? if not, does that mean the company will just let the other islanders be raided and pillaged by pirates so long as these pirates don't encroach on the client's land? what if in taking the non-clients' land, the pirates secure a strategic position to attack the clients' land? would the company then be obliged to defend the entire island? and again, if so, should the other islander's have to pitch in?

>>17884

If you don't buy any insurance you'll sure feel foolish when your hut gets blown up. Or the pirates take your money.

[Or y'know you get killed]

Okay, I'm new to /liberty/, so why don't we like Rand?

>>17906

>so why don't we like Rand?

>identity politics

>>>/out/

>>17914

>RAND PAUL IS LIBERTY THE WORST IMAGINABLE RESULT OF RON PAUL

Rand Paul is, to the liberty movement, the worst imaginable result*

>>17914

Chill out bro, slavery isn't bad because property follows from use and not from the human essence.

>>17919

gr8 b9 m10

>>17923

Did the ancients allocate the essence of man into their slaves? No, they used them as property.

>>17876

> But should one landlord or person be able to say 'meh, other people should pay for my coastal defences' ? Shouldn't they paid for by taxes so everyone necessarily contributes?

So, your real question is "is there a libertarian solution to the defense freeloader problem?". Yes, if it becomes a problem, freeloaders will be informed that, unless they pay, they are not protected. If/when invaders come, they will be allowed orderly passage into the freeloader's property.

>>18028

Hi Feudalism

>>18029

> le feudalism maymay

It's not feudalism if everyone owns land.

>>18030

Hello dear peasant, I see you haven't given me half of the crop you grew on your privately owned land which you already have to give me full acces to in exchange for protection, the raiders that I for some odd reason refuse to kill when they attack are coming, so fuck you got mine.

>>18031

> which you already have to give me full acces to in exchange for protection

You failed at reading comprehension. No one is forced to "give full access" to anyone.

> the raiders that I refuse to kill when they attack BECAUSE YOU CHEEKY BASTARD REFUSE TO PAY FOR THAT SERVICE, are coming, so, last chance, do you WANT THIS SERVICE OR NOT? IF YOU DO, PAY FOR IT, AT MARKET PRICE FOR NON-SUBSCRIBERS. Otherwise, good luck.

FTFY

>>18033

Except that the mafia's "protection" racket is a threat to use violence, not just to stay aside. Who else does that? Oh, yes, statist governments.

>>18033

You don't have a right to defence from extortion.

If you want to be protected you ought to pay for that service yourself.

Government wouldn't protect you very well either if it's any consolation

>>18034

Wow, wow, wow where did I threaten you? I'm offering a service in the freemarket, you don't have any evidence that I'm threatening you.

>>18035

>If you want to be protected you ought to pay for that service yourself.

Shout out to all abused children to break open their piggy bank and hire a bodyguard.

>>18037

Because only the government can protect poor abused children?

When did you turn communist?

>>18035

DOSE FUGGEN CAPITALISTS DESERB TO BE EXTORTED ANYWAYS MISSION ACCOMPLISHED THE FREE MARKET WORKED WAIT WHAT

>>18037

>Wow, wow, wow where did I threaten you? I'm offering a service in the freemarket, you don't have any evidence that I'm threatening you.

Oh, I see. Thanks, but I already have a contract with a top-tier PDA. They are very effective and proactive. Have a nice day, greetings to your wife and two children. :^)

>>18042

The free market working would mean people are being defended against extortion- using voluntary methods, and for a low cost.

I don't see any reason that wouldn't be the case :/

>>18040

And if they can't pay, they can provide services to a guard!

Free market fixes it again!

>>18041

N-O-T A-N A-R-G-U-M-E-N-T

Ancaps are so limited in their reasoning and communication. It's an intellectual lobotomy.

>>18043

Gangster vs PDA war now!

>>18045

> Gangster vs PDA war now!

I'd like to see you try.

>>18045

'So what? We have to pay money for food? That's not fair!'

I assume your solution to the problem of having to pay for things, is to make protection 'free', by deferring the duty to an unaccountable and inefficient monopoly funded through extortion.

By the way we've said loads about poverty, including child poverty, and it's a separate issue entirely, to the problem of protection.

>>18046

I don't have to try because it already happens in the libertarian libya.

>>18047

Strong states have proven a lot better at it than para-militarities, militias guard firms and other such groups that rise in libertarian circumstances. There is a better anarchist against it, but that works from the position that there is no such thing as private property begin with.

Also, read Hegel and Hobbes.

>By the way we've said loads about poverty, including child poverty, and it's a separate issue entirely, to the problem of protection.

Poor child is abused. Poor child needs protection, poor child has no money to pay, poor child has to pay in bodily services, Rothbard smiled.

>>18049

> I don't have to try because it already happens in the libertarian libya.

Libya is anything but libertarian. It's just a failed state in a war against wannabe states. None of them are remotely libertarian, and neither is the situation as a whole.

>>18049

>Strong states have proven a lot better at it than para-militarities,

>MOM, LOOK, I'M STILL SPOUTING BULLSHIT THAT'S BEEN DEBUNKED IN THE FIRST 5 PAGES OF HOW MANY BOOKS

From Myth of National Defense

In the American Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson affirmed “…when a long train of abuses and usurpations pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is in their right, it is their duty to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.” Introduction More than 200 years after the Declaration of Independence, it seems appropriate to raise the question whether governments have in fact done what they were designed to do, or if experience or theory has provided us with grounds to consider other possibly more effective guards for our future security. The present volume aims to provide an answer to this fundamental question. In fact, this question has recently assumed new urgency through the events of September 11, 2001. Governments are supposed to protect us from terrorism. Yet what has been the U.S. government’s role in the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon? The U.S. government commands a “defense” budget of $400 billion per annum, a sum equal to the combined annual defense budgets of the next 24 biggest government spenders. It employs a worldwide network of spies and informants. However, it was unable to prevent commercial airliners from being hijacked and used as missiles against prominent civilian and military targets. Worse, the U.S. government did not only fail to prevent the disaster of September 11, it actually contributed to the likelihood of such an event. In pursuing an interventionist foreign policy (taking the form of economic sanctions, troops stationed in more than 100 countries, relentless bombings, propping up despotic regimes, taking sides in irresolvable land and ethnic disputes, and otherwise attempting political and military management of whole areas of the globe), the government provided the very motivation for foreign terrorists and made the U.S. their prime target. Moreover, how was it possible that men armed with no more than box cutters could inflict the terrible damage they did? Obviously, this was possible only because the government prohibited airlines and pilots from protecting their own property by force of arms, thus rendering every commercial airline vulnerable and unprotected against hijackers. A $50 pistol in the cockpit could have done what $400 billion in the hands of government were unable to do. The Myth of National Defense 2 And what was the lesson drawn from such failures? In the aftermath of the events, the U.S. foreign policy became even more aggressively interventionist and threatening. The U.S. military overthrew the Afghani government that was said to be “harboring” the terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden. In the course of this, thousands of innocent civilians were killed as “collateral damage,” but bin Laden has not been captured or punished to this day, almost two years after the attacks. And once a U.S. approved government had been installed in Afghanistan, the U.S. government turned its attention to wars against other enemy states, in particular Iraq with its huge oil reserves. The U.S. refused even to rule out the employment of nuclear weapons against enemy regimes. No doubt, this policy helped to further increase the number of recruits into the ranks of people willing to use extreme violence against the U.S. as a means of retribution. At the same time, domestically the government used the crisis which it had helped to provoke to further increase its own power at the expense of the people’s liberty and property rights. Government spending, in particular on “defense,” was vastly increased, and a new government department for “homeland security” was created. Airport security was taken over by the federal government and government bureaucrats, and decisive steps toward a complete electronic citizen surveillance were taken. Truly, then, the current events cry out for a systematic rethinking of the issues of defense and security and the respective roles of government, the market, and society in providing them

>>18049

>strong states are better at it

Strong states are probably better at providing non-excludable goods like national defence, which suffer from the public good problem

But when the goods are excludable-as in this example case- everyone will want to pay for the defence so they don't get excluded. So there would be no problem funding it

>there will be exploited child prostitutes in ancap land who are made to deliver services to the mafia

No because charity first of all. People care about each other

Second because the child could find legal work since we don't ban child labour to force them in2 whores.

Third because police is only like $1.50 a day WHEN DONE BY THE GOVERNMENT.

And that includes drug busts, harassing old women, paper pushing, and all the other non-essentials. It would be pretty easy- even for that one hypothetical an orphan who no-one in the world cares about or wants to help- to acquire protection at a low cost and so escape becoming a whore.

They could probably do it just by picking up coins from the pavement

>>18054

wow meme flag still there

Two of the most widely accepted propositions among political economists and political philosophers are the following: First: Every “monopoly” is “bad” from the viewpoint of consumers. Monopoly here is understood in its classical sense as an exclusive privilege granted to a single producer of a commodity Introduction 3 or service; i.e., as the absence of “free entry” into a particular line of production. In other words, only one agency, A, may produce a given good, x. Any such monopolist is “bad” for consumers because, shielded from potential new entrants into his area of production, the price of his product x will be higher and the quality of x lower than otherwise. Second, the production of security must be undertaken by and is the primary function of government. Here, security is understood in the wide sense adopted in the Declaration of Independence: as the protection of life, property (liberty), and the pursuit of happiness from domestic violence (crime) as well as external (foreign) aggression (war). In accordance with generally accepted terminology, government is defined as a territorial monopoly of law and order (the ultimate decision maker and enforcer). That both propositions are clearly incompatible has rarely caused concern among economists and philosophers, and in so far as it has, the typical reaction has been one of taking exception to the first proposition rather than the second. The contributors to this volume challenge this “orthodox” view and offer both empirical and theoretical support to the contrary thesis: that it is the second proposition, not the first, which is false and ought to be rejected. As far as empirical—historical—evidence is concerned, proponents of the orthodox view face obvious embarrassment. The recently ended twentieth century was characterized by a level of human rights violations unparalleled in all of human history. In his book Death by Government, Rudolph Rummel estimates some 170 million government-caused deaths in the twentieth century. The historical evidence appears to indicate that, rather than protecting life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness of their citizens, governments must be considered the greatest threat to human security. Proponents of the orthodox view (willing to compromise the first thesis regarding the “evil” of monopoly in order to maintain the second concerning the necessity of state government) cannot entirely ignore this seemingly overwhelming evidence The Myth of National Defense 4 to the contrary. If they wish to rescue from refutation the thesis that government is indispensible for the provision of law and order, they must revise the second thesis. Experience shows that some states are aggressors, not protectors. Thus, if one is not to discard the second thesis altogether, its further specification is required: it is only possible to claim that some states protect. Accordingly, rather than faulting government as such for the dismal security record in particular during the past century, several attempts have been made to explain this record as the result of specific forms of government. Numerous political scientists, including the aforementioned Rummel, have tried to show by various statistical means that it is the absence of democratic government which explains the “anomalies” of the twentieth century. Admittedly, democracies go to war against nondemocratic regimes, but supposedly not against other democracies. Hence, it would seem to follow—and this thesis has in the meantime become part of the American neoconservative folklore—that once the Wilsonian dream of “making the world safe for democracy” has been achieved, eternal peace and security will be accomplished. In a similar vein, political economists such as James Buchanan and the school of “constitutional economics” have suggested that the admittedly miserable record of governments concerning the provision of internal and external security can be systematically improved by means of constitutional reforms aimed at the strict limitation of governmental powers. Both these explanations are scrutinized and rejected in this volume. As for the thesis of the peaceful nature of democracy, several contributors note that, in accordance with military historians such as J.F.C. Fuller and M. Howard, it rests on a rather selective or even erroneous reading of the historical record.

>>18056

Let me mention only two such misreadings. First, how can this thesis account for a seemingly obvious counterexample such as the American War of Southern Independence (the War Between the States) with its until then unparalleled brutality? Answer: by excluding and ignoring it or downplaying its significance. Introduction 5 Second, proponents of the peaceful-democracy thesis typically support their claim by classifying traditional monarchies and modern dictatorships as autocratic and nondemocratic and contrasting both to what they classify as genuine “democracies.” Yet historically (and if any grouping must be done at all), it is democracy and dictatorship that should be grouped together. Traditional monarchies only resemble dictatorships superficially. Instead, dictatorships are a regular outgrowth of mass democracy. Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, and Mao were distinctly democratic rulers as compared to the former Emperors of Russia, Germany, Austria, and China. Indeed, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, and Mao (and almost all of their smaller and lesser known successors) were outspoken in their hatred of everything monarchic and aristocratic. They knew that they owed their rise to democratic mass politics, and they employed democratic politics (elections, referenda, mass rallies, mass media propaganda, etc.) throughout their reign. On the other hand, as for the proposal of constitutional reforms aimed at limiting state power, several contributors to this volume explain that any such attempts must be considered futile and ineffective if and insofar as the interpretation and the enforcement of such limitations is left to government itself or to one of its organs, such as a governmental supreme court. (See more on this below.) More convincing to the contributors of this volume appears a third thesis, advanced by the economist Ludwig von Mises, which may be considered a combination of the above. Mises asserts that in order to fulfill its primary function as a provider of security, a government must satisfy two conditions: it must be democratically organized, and it must permit unlimited secession in principle. [W]henever the inhabitants of a particular territory, whether it be a single village, a whole district, or a series of adjacent districts, make it known, by a freely conducted plebiscite, that they no longer wish to remain united to the state to which they belong at the time, their wishes are to be The Myth of National Defense 6 respected and complied with. This is the only feasible and effective way of preventing revolutions and international wars. (Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism [Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Foundation for Economic Education, and San Francisco, Calif.: Cobden Press, 1985], p. 109) One obvious attraction of this thesis is that it can account for the events of the American War of Southern Independence. Thus, until 1861, it was generally taken for granted in the U.S. that a right to secession existed, and that the Union was nothing but a voluntary association of independent states; but when the desire for the unrestricted right to secede was no longer respected, the state turned from protector to aggressor. Mises’s thesis is accorded considerable attention in this volume, and the role of secession as a means for limiting or escaping government depredation is emphasized repeatedly. However, in requiring a protective state to allow unlimited secession from its jurisdiction, Mises’s explanation essentially renders the State a voluntary membership organization with taxes amounting to voluntarily paid (or withheld) membership dues.

>>18057

With an unlimited right to secession even at the level of individual households, the government is no longer a “State,” but a club. Hence, strictly speaking, Mises’s thesis must be considered a rejection of proposition two rather than merely its revision. The contributors to this volume concur with this judgment, not only for empirical reasons but even more so for theoretical ones. Every attempt to explain the dismal performance of governments (States) qua providers of security as inherent in the nature of state-government must begin with a precise definition of state-government (the State). The definition of the State adopted throughout this volume is uncontroversial. It corresponds closely to that proposed by Thomas Hobbes and adopted to this day by countless political philosophers and economists. Briefly, Hobbes argued that in the state of nature, men would constantly be at each others’ throats. Homo homini Introduction 7 lupus est. Each individual, left to his own devices and provisions, would spend too little on his own defense. Hence, permanent interpersonal warfare would result. The solution to this presumably intolerable situation, according to Hobbes and his followers, is the institution of a State (government). In order to institute peaceful cooperation—security—among themselves, two individuals, A and B, require a third independent party, S, as ultimate judge and peacemaker. However, this third party, S, is not just another individual, and the good provided by S, that of security, is not just another “private” good. Rather, S is a sovereign and has as such two unique powers. On the one hand, S can insist that his subjects, A and B, not seek protection from anyone but him; that is, S is a compulsory territorial monopolist of protection and ultimate decision making (jurisdiction). On the other hand, S can determine unilaterally (without unanimous consent) how much A and B must spend on their own security; that is, S has the power to impose taxes in order to provide security “collectively.” Based on this definition of government as a compulsory territorial monopolist of protection and jurisdiction equipped with the power to tax without unanimous consent, the contributors to this volume argue that, regardless of whether such a government is a monarchy, a democracy, or a dictatorship, any notion of limiting its power and safeguarding individual life, liberty, and property must be deemed illusory. Under monopolistic auspices the price of justice and protection must rise and its quality must fall. A tax-funded protection agency, it is pointed out, is a contradiction in terms: it is an expropriating property protector and can only lead to ever more taxes and less protection. In fact, even if a state limited its activities exclusively to the protection of life, liberty, and property (as a protective state à la Jefferson would do), the further question of how much security to provide would arise. Motivated like everyone else by selfinterest and the disutility of labor, but with the unique power to tax without consent, a government’s answer will always be the same: to maximize expenditures on protection—and almost all of a nation’s wealth can be consumed by the cost of The Myth of National Defense 8 protection—and at the same time to minimize the production of protection. Furthermore, a monopoly of jurisdiction must lead to a deterioration in the quality of justice and protection

>>18058

. If one can appeal only to the State for justice and protection, justice and protection will be distorted in favor of government—constitutions and supreme courts notwithstanding. After all, constitutions and supreme courts are state constitutions and courts, and whatever limitations to government action they might contain is determined by agents of the very same institution. Accordingly, the definitions of life, liberty, and property and their protection will continually be altered and the range of jurisdiction expanded to the state’s advantage. The first person to provide a systematic explanation for the apparent failure of governments as security producers along the above sketched lines was Gustave de Molinari (1818–1912), a prominent Belgian-born French economist, student of JeanBaptiste Say, and teacher of Vilfredo Pareto, and for several decades the editor of the Journal des Économistes, the professional journal of the French Economic Association, the Societé d’Économie Politique. De Molinari’s central argument was laid out in his article “De la Production de la Securité” of February 1849. The argument is worth quoting because of its theoretical rigor and its seemingly visionary foresight: If there is one well-established truth in political economy, it is this: That in all cases, for all commodities that serve to provide for the tangible or intangible needs of consumers, it is in the consumer’s best interest that labor and trade remain free, because the freedom of labor and trade have as their necessary and permanent result the maximum reduction of price. And this: That the interests of the consumer of any commodity whatsoever should always prevail over the interests of the producer. Introduction 9 Now in pursuing these principles, one arrives at this rigorous conclusion: That the production of security should, in the interests of the consumers of this intangible commodity, remain subject to the law of free competition. Whence it follows: That no government should have the right to prevent another government from going into competition with it, or require consumers of security to come exclusively to it for this commodity. . . . Either this is logically true, or else the principles on which economic science is based are invalid. (Gustave de Molinari, Production of Security, J.H. McCulloch, trans. [New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, 1977], pp. 3–4) De Molinari then predicted what would happen if the production of security is monopolized: If, on the contrary, the consumer is not free to buy security wherever he pleases, you forthwith see open up a large profession dedicated to arbitrariness and bad management. Justice becomes slow and costly, the police vexatious, individual liberty is no longer respected, the price of security is abusively inflated and inequitably apportioned, according to the power and influence of this or that class of consumers. (Molinari, Production of Security, pp. 13–14) Nearly all contributors to this volume pay explicit tribute to Molinari’s pathbreaking theoretical insight. Hence, the present volume is dedicated to the memory of Gustave de Molinari. If Molinari’s explanation of the dismal performance of government as security provider by the nature of government qua compulsory territorial monopolist of law and order is accepted, The Myth of National Defense 10 however, then the question of alternatives arises. Accordingly, the bulk of this volume consists of contributions to this quest for private and voluntary (market-produced) alternatives to the failed and fundamentally flawed system of state-protection. How could and would an alternative system of freely competing security producers work? Based on historical experience and economic logic, how effective are private alternatives such as mercenaries, guerrillas, militias, partisans, and privateers? What are the consequences of the free proliferation of weapons, in particular of nuclear arms? What is the role of ideology and public opinion in defense and war? What type of good is defense, a “private” or a “public” good? Can protective defense be provided by freely competing and financed insurance agencies? How would the “logic” of competitive insurance-protection differ from that of monopolistic state-protection? How can the transition from a system of monopolistic to competitive security production be achieved? What is the role of secession in this process? How can state-free societies—natural orders—possibly defend themselves against state attacks and invasions? These are the central questions addressed and answered in the present volume by an international assembly of contributors from philosophy, economics, history, sociology, and political science.

>>18059

>>18049

k there you go nigger your shit has been debunked years ago please come up with an original argument that hasn't been debunked a million times

>>18060

and if that's insufficient read the book

https://mises.org/library/myth-national-defense-essays-theory-and-history-security-production

>>18055

>But when the goods are excludable-as in this example case- everyone will want to pay for the defence so they don't get excluded. So there would be no problem funding it

So the police will be an insurance company that only provides for people who can afford it.

>No because charity first of all. People care about each other

Tell that to all the children who weren't saved by charity.

>>18060

>debunked years ago

>posts hans-hermann hoppe

>>18066

>debunked years ago

>posts hans-hermann hoppe who is infinitely more qualified than you

yes, I did

>>18067

Ah yes, qualified carpenter of capitalist matrushka dolls.

>>18066

>it-it won't be freeeeee!

Yup, price competition and differentiation will exist. And it is a good thing too

>implying people won't be uncharitable

So why do they vote for left-wing parties, if not because they think it'll help the poor? Do they vote for left-wing parties in an attempt to help the rich?

>>18069

Also you didn't read the post where I explained why literally everyone will be able to afford the police

realize it's no different from the private owned war boats that usually cruise the waters around it to defend Freedom Park™'s private property :DDDD

>>18081

>I just really, really, like sucking cock

t. you

>not blasting their warships with cruise missiles for trespassing

>>18474

>cruise missile

>cruz

>ted cruz

>ted cruz missiles

>cruz missiles

ayyyy

>>18681

I don't trust Trump at all. I think the /pol/ jackasses are in for a nasty surprise if by some miracle that greasy new york snake somehow makes it past Hillary.

Ultimately I'm resigned that a faggot that believes in socialized healthcare is going to make it to office and by the time someone else gets in the roots of Obamacare will be too deep to pull out, like what happened with that commie cunt FDR. God help us all.

>>18683

I just hope the candidate who causes the most gridlock gets in. Nothing happening is way preferable than anything they want happening.

>>18701

Honestly I'd be damn satisfied with a Cruz presidency all things considered. I'm unhappy with his stances on abortion and privacy but he's mana from heaven compared to the last twenty years of sludge.

>>18702

Cruz is literally Israel.prez :/

fuckin' Bernie > Cruz tbh ;;;(((

>>18706

>muh israel tho

I don't care about that. Anybody halfway sensible knows how the game is played, it's only emotional /pol/ retards that carried away with muh zion is the great satan.

>>18707

You don't care about him spending trillions bombing the fuck out of the Middle East and killing people?

Are ya Jewish?

>>18709

>You don't care about him spending trillions bombing the fuck out of the Middle East and killing people?

I truly doubt it'll be that expensive first of all, second of all the perfect candidate does not exist. They always concede ground on some issue. Smashing the mortal shit out out of religious fundamentalists is a far more palatable sacrifice to me than socializing the fucking healthcare system even further like Trump wants to do or blowing open the borders like Rand Paul.

>>17861

>Be any country not in Nato, not Russia, and not China.

>FeelsGoodMan.jpg

>Suddenly there is a visit from the Assistant Deputy Director at the Dept of State

>You guys have to give multinational corporations access to your land, and privatize your national parks and spaces and sell them to those corporations for pennies or we say you are harboring terrorists and bomb the shit out of you

>oh fuck

>what do?

>>18973

>not having multinational corporations or private ownership of land

>FeelsGoodMan.jpg

wut?

wut

>>18978

Have shills invaded this place too?

You honestly read that entire scenario and thought the offensive concept was that a country existed with publicly owned land?

>>18981

Yes because that's why it says

>privatize

Although I should have said completely private ownership of land

Forgot to be sassy in the 1st one

>>17861

>Point out that billions in corporate holdings are secretly stashed here.

>Point out that all the major multinational corporations have operations here due to the phenomenal ease of doing business.

>Launch sad black-and-white viral video campaign featuring women and children crying quietly into the camera.

It won't be long before the corporate overlords of America and the general public are screaming for his head.

>>18983

>>18982

So you must be pro-TPP then

>>18990

Mostly

>>18992

I'm not /pol/