>>1049>Care to elaborate? I don't remember Mao really attacking Stalin in anything I've read.At the November 1957 Moscow Conference:
"Another aspect of Mao’s speech that drew immediate attention was his discussion of the internal struggle in the CPSU. When talking about unity, Mao inserted the following comment about the ouster of Molotov:
'I endorsed the CPSU Central Committee’s solution on the Molotov question. That was a struggle of opposites. The facts prove that unity could not be achieved and that the two sides were mutually exclusive. The Molotov clique took the opportunity to attack at a time when Comrade Khrushchev was abroad and unprepared. However, even though they waged a surprise attack, our Comrade Khrushchev is no fool. He is a smart person who immediately mobilized his troops and waged a victorious counterattack. That struggle was one between two lines: one erroneous and one relatively correct. In the four or five years since Stalin’s death the situation has improved considerably in the Soviet Union in the sphere of both domestic policy and foreign policy. This indicates that the line represented by Comrade Khrushchev is correct and that opposition to his line is incorrect.'"
(Zhihua Shen & Yafeng Xia. "Hidden Currents during the Honeymoon: Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference," in Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 11, Number 4, Fall 2009, pp. 108-109.)
Hua Guofeng also told Tito when the latter visited Beijing that Mao had considered his nationalist course correct in 1948-49, as noted in the Sino-Soviet split article. Hoxha's memoir "The Khrushchevites" likewise has Mao recalling to Hoxha that Stalin's attitude towards Tito was wrong.
Finally there's Mao's "On the Ten Major Relationships" from 1956:
>The "Left" adventurism pursued by Wang Ming in the latter part of the Second Revolutionary Civil War period and his Right opportunism in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan can both be traced to Stalin. At the time of the War of Liberation, Stalin first enjoined us not to press on with the revolution, maintaining that if civil war flared up, the Chinese nation would run the risk of destroying itself. Then when fighting did erupt, he took us half seriously, half sceptically. When we won the war, Stalin suspected that ours was a victory of the Tito type, and in 1949 and 1950 the pressure on us was very strong indeed. Even so, we maintain the estimate of 30 per cent for his mistakes and 70 per cent for his achievements. This is only fair.The way Maoism was able to justify itself in Chinese conditions was by contrasting the supposedly "dogmatic" Comintern line of the 1920s-30s with the "creative" line of Mao.
I don't have statistics for ownership in the 1950s, but there's two works which critiicize the economic and political views of Maoism:
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http://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/cousml-neo/index.htm (see parts IV, V and VI)
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http://marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-7/rpo-china.htm (this covers the "Cultural Revolution" as well)