/marx/ - Marxism

From the "Short Course" history of the CPSU(B):
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A glaring instance of the new tactics of the class enemy was the counter-revolutionary mutiny in Kronstadt. It began in March 1921, a week before the Tenth Party Congress. Whiteguards, in complicity with Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and representatives of foreign states, assumed the lead of the mutiny. The mutineers at first used a "Soviet" signboard to camouflage their purpose of restoring the power and property of the capitalists and landlords. They raised the cry: "Soviets without Communists!" The counter-revolutionaries tried to exploit the discontent of the petty bourgeois masses in order to overthrow the power of the Soviets under a pseudo-Soviet slogan.

Two circumstances facilitated the outbreak of the Kronstadt mutiny: the deterioration in the composition of the ships' crews, and the weakness of the Bolshevik organization in Kronstadt. Nearly all the old sailors who had taken part in the October Revolution were at the front, heroically fighting in the ranks of the Red Army. The naval replenishments consisted of new men, who had not been schooled in the revolution. These were a perfectly raw peasant mass who gave expression to the peasantry's discontent with the surplus-appropriation system. As for the Bolshevik organization in Kronstadt, it had been greatly weakened by a series of mobilizations for the front. This enabled the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Whiteguards to worm their way into Kronstadt and to seize control of it.

The mutineers gained possession of a first-class fortress, the fleet, and a vast quantity of arms and ammunition. The international counter-revolutionaries were triumphant. But their jubilation was premature. The mutiny was quickly put down by Soviet troops. Against the Kronstadt mutineers the Party sent its finest sons -- delegates to the Tenth Congress, headed by Comrade Voroshilov. The Red Army men advanced on Kronstadt across a thin sheet of ice; it broke in places and many were drowned. The almost impregnable forts of Kronstadt had to be taken by storm; but loyalty to the revolution, bravery and readiness to die for the Soviets won the day. The fortress of Kronstadt fell before the onslaught of the Red troops. The Kronstadt mutiny was suppressed.

>>2324
>How is the historical evidence for this story versus the mainstream story?
http://www.marxist.com/kronstadt-trotsky-was-right.htm

It's a Trot source but you can just ignore the asides about "Stalinism."

>>2324
It depends on what you consider to be "mainstream".
The Kronstadt side: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/goldman/works/1920s/disillusionment/ch27.htm
Ismail already provided Trotsky's account (in case anti-stalinist sentiments confuse you, by the way, Trotsky was acting with full consent of the bolshevik party, including Lenin and Stalin).

>>2326
"Stalinist" and Trot sources on Kronstadt will be pretty much identical. In fact Trotsky in his memoirs claimed Stalin took a "wait and see" attitude towards the sailors and that Lenin criticized him for prevaricating rather than supporting immediate military action.

Also, just for the hell of it, here's the revisionist viewpoint (again, basically identical) in the 1970s "Great Soviet Encyclopedia":
>Kronstadt Anti-Soviet Rebellion of 1921
>a counterrevolutionary action by the garrison of Kronstadt and the crews of certain ships of the Baltic Fleet in March 1921, organized by the SR’s (Socialist Revolutionaries), Mensheviks, anarchists, and White Guards with the support of foreign imperialists. The Kronstadt Anti-Soviet Rebellion was one of the counterrevolution’s attempts to apply the new tactic of “exploding Soviet power from within.”

>The revolt reflected the petit bourgeois masses’ political vacillations, which intensified in late 1920 and early 1921 as a result of the economic dislocation, famine, and other hardships caused by the Civil War of 1918–20. Dissatisfaction with the policies of War Communism seized the peasantry and some of the workers, and this situation was exploited by the petit bourgeois parties, who organized conspiracies and insurrections (for example, in the Tambov region, the Volga Region, the Ukraine, and Siberia).

>The Kronstadt Anti-Soviet Rebellion was made possible by a substantial renewal during the Civil War of Baltic Fleet personnel with peasant reinforcements and even declassé elements who had fallen under the influence of petit bourgeois and anarchist conspirators. In addition, the weakness of the Bolshevik party organization and a slackening in the work of political education opened the way for a rebellion. The conspirators unleashed a campaign of demagogic agitation. At general meetings of the crews of battleships on February 28 and a city-wide meeting on lakornyi Square on March 1, resolutions were adopted demanding freedom of activity for “leftist socialist parties,” the elimination of commissars, freedom of trade, and new elections to the soviets. The leaders of the rebellion advanced the slogan “Soviets without Communists,” anticipating a shift of power to the petit bourgeois parties, or, in effect, the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the establishment of conditions for open activity by the White Guard and for the restoration of capitalism.

>On March 2 the “Provisional Revolutionary Committee” was established under the leadership of S. M. Petrichenko and with a membership consisting of anarchists and SR-Menshevik “non-party” elements who had been influenced by propaganda. Communists and workers in the soviets were arrested. “Revkom” (the Revolutionary Committee) was a cover for the true leaders of the rebellion, who on March 3 established a “defense staff’ made up of former captain E. N. Solov’ianov, former general A. R. Kozlovskii, the commander of artillery of the fortress, and former lieutenant-colonel B. A. Arkannikov.

>The Kronstadt Anti-Soviet Rebellion posed a great threat to Soviet powers, inasmuch as the main base of the Baltic Fleet and the key point of Petrograd was in enemy hands. About 27,000 sailors and soldiers took part in the rebellion. Two battleships and other fighting vessels, as many as 140 coastal defense guns, and more than 100 machine-guns were at their disposal.

>Under the leadership of V. I. Lenin, the Central Committee of the RCP (Bolshevik) and the Soviet government took urgent measures to suppress the rebellion. A state of seige was declared in Petrograd in accordance with the March 2 resolution of the Soviet of Labor and Defense, and the Seventh Army (about 18,000 men) under the command of M. N. Tukhachevskii was reinstated on March 5. However, the first offensive on Kronstadt, which was undetaken on March 8, ended in failure because of poor preparations and insufficient forces (about 3,000 men).

>The Tenth Party Congress, which was meeting in Moscow at this time, sent about 300 delegates to the Seventh Army, including K. E. Voroshilov, A. S. Bubnov, P. I. Baranov, V. P. Zatonskii, I. S. Konev, and A. A. Fadeev. The provincial committees mobilized hundreds of officials. Political education was expanded among the troops, and talented military leaders were given command of units (for example, A. J. Sediakin, E. S. Kazanskii, P. E. Dybenko, V. K. Putna, I. F. Fed’ko, la. F. Fabritsius, and I. V. Tiulenev). By March 16, the strength of the Seventh Army had been increased to 45,000 men. At night on March 17, Soviet troops crossed the ice and launched an attack on Kronstadt. In the morning they burst into the city. After fierce fighting the rebels were routed on the morning of March 18, losing more than 1,000 killed, more than 2,000 wounded, and 2,500 captured with their weapons. About 8,000 men fled to Finland. Soviet forces lost 527 killed and 3,285 wounded.