/philosophy/ - Philosophy

>>558 (OP)
Depends on which relativism you subscribe to. Absolute relativism refutes itself because if all points of view are true, then the view that morals are objective is true and immediately trumps all other moral stances that are relativistic. This only applies if you're taking the relative stance that all moral views are "equally true".

If you take a nihilist view, that is that no views are true, you escape the logical trap of absolute relativism. You're still a subjective relativist, but you never make an objective claim that your own moral propensities are true beyond yourself and your capacity to assert them on and through others (Nietzschean).

A third possibility is absolute ethical nihilism while affirming subjectively-objective ethics. There can objectively be said to be a form of good for humans, however, you cannot speak of human good as "the good-in-itself" that is the universal moral truth. Objectively there indeed is factually a human good, human welfare and social stability with minimal neuroses, something that psychology as a science is increasingly uncovering. We know for a fact what kinds of things make for a very fucked up kind of people, and what other things generally make for very well fit and healthy psychologically individuals.


Fuck you for being this lazy and asking shitty questions.

>>560
I'm not entirely sure you represent absolute relativism fairly. It's not primarily equalisations of all statements to the same level of truth, but rather a nullification of the concept of comparative veracity itself. This is not necessarily nihilistic, because it is not a denial of truth but a denial of the relevance of truth.
Applied to morality, it would deny the supremacy of any moral sentiment over the other, but it would not make the additional assumption that it makes both equal (be it equally moral or equally true). Because this necessarily entails conflict between irreconcilable positions, it will likely result in a variant of egoism, making ones own moral code suprior to others by virtue of being the one held by oneself. This doesn't have to be self-defeating, because you can aknowledge the theoretical equality of all positions and still favour your own.

Because this is neither nihilistic nor constructivistic (if I may summarise your third category in one perhaps problematic word) I would attribute it to moral relativism. But I'd be curious to hear your stance on this.

Also, please refrain from calling questions shitty, especially when they make up a rather essntial part of a philosophical discipline. Instead, scold the OP for not even attempting to express thought, ideas, or further questions of their own.
I myself will gladly scold OP for not replying to you, revealing either a lack of time (in which case I apologise) or a lack of interest (in which case this thread was indeed somewhat superfluous).

>>777

The longevity of a question in philosophic history is symptomatic of how confused it is to even ask the question. Questions which cannot be answered never get answered, and thus never die until we learn to stop asking. Its doesnt make the question magnificent that we still ask it, instead we should be embarrassed that we are still so confused.

An answer that merely possibly answers the question, is an obstruction to philosophic success. We name possible answers with things like '-ism'. I think its totally fair to say that OP has made a mistake simply by asking about the -ism in question.

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To actually address your comments tho:

If 'moral sentiment' A doesnt stand superior or inferior to B, its misleading to suppose that they could (or couldnt) be equal. For if A and B do not stand in in relation to each other as superior, inferior, or equal, then its because such a comparison makes no sense to begin with, not because superiority is sensible and possible and somehow does not imply something about the possibility of equality.

You say 'it would deny the supremacy of any …'. No it wouldnt deny the supremacy. It couldnt, because such a denial has no grounds.

It would be like 'denying' that I am taller as the 4th amendment of the US constitution. Its not true, but not because we can measure an amendment to the US constitution, but because such things dont have height.

With that said, if you are admitting certain claims can be morally irrelevant (irrelevant truth of a moral statement), then you are precluding what could possibly be a contribution to the moral discussion. I wonder why you would even mention it then, if its intrinsically outside of the scope of this topic?

>>778
I don't share your notion of "philosophic success" though it's a very interesting question and might merit a thread of its own.
You seem to expect philosophy to yield results in the shape of answers, or at least to only ask questions that can definitively be answered, regardless if they already are or not. To me, philosophy is a lot more about questions, the plurality of efforts to address the same one being part of what makes it so interesting. Naturally most, if not all, attempts will be seriously flawed, but that doesn't make them inhrently worthless. Isms are a reductionistic but nonetheless useful way to distinguish between different approaches or different premises. I dono't think a puristic "no isms allowed" attitude would be particularly better off, though I may misunderstand your point.

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What I meant was that the veracity of one "moral sentiment" over another is indiscernable. As such, they are equal in terms of claims to veracity. But such a claim need not be made, since relativism either dismisses the notion of veracity completely, or makes that call based on egoism. The latter still doesn't make a "ranking" based on veracity, though. Nor does it necessarily dismiss the notion of veracity, it just deems it inaccessible or immaterial.

It's very possible to consider moral sentiments incomparable to each other because they themselves are meaningless. In that case it is futile to talk of veracity in the first place, but even then you could relate every moral sentiment to the same thing it has no part in. We are both equal in a lot of negatives, that equalises us in relation to those. But that obviously doesn't mean we are identical.

Perhaps my wording was misleading. It doesn't so much deny supremacy, but deny the potential to determine supremacy, as such it denies the relevance of supremacy when it comes to moral sentiments. It's a dismissal, and though there might be a strong case against the usefulness of such a dismissal, it seems to me nonetheless a valid stance when confronted with the question of moral relativism.

Finally, I said only that the veracity of one moral sentiment over another (basically implying veracity of any moral sentiment) is dismissable. That would make them morally irrelevant, since relativism does not ncessarily have a perception of discernable (objectivistic) truth. I naturally bring this up because there is often the unspoken assumption that morality is linked to truth, which I don't think is a necessary connection, but is one that no.560 made when stating relativism as meaning "all moral views are 'equally true'".

>>780

Yeah I dont know how to reply. I just dont understand what we are talking about. There seem to be some fundamental things I dont have the confidence we will be able to overcome.

ALSO. I made a thread for our side conversation: http://8ch.net/philosophy/res/781.html

>>782
I'm sorry to hear that. I had hoped to have been reasonably clear, but English isn't my first language so my grasp of it may be a bit insufficient.

Anyway, it seems your main gripe was that moral sentiments (which remain undefined) cannot be considered equal in any way, because either truth or any other standard of evaluation cannot reasonably be applied to them. I counter by stating that the absence of discernibility is a sign of relativism, and that this kind of relativism is perfectly well served with resorting to egoism rather than a concept of truth.
But seeing as this is not really my own stance and I merely wanted to expand upon no.560 narrow and dismissive portrayal of moral relativism, as well as due to my unfortunate inability to communicte what I mean clearly, I am fine with leaving the matter unresolved. Though naturally I'm not opposed to no.560 chiming in.

Thank you for the new thread, by the way. I have to run now, but I'll drop in and try my hand at expressing my thoughts later today.

>>777
I'm >>560

I didn't quite understand what you were saying in that post, but with the clarification of >>780 and >>783 I think I see your general point, but I have to say I don't agree.

The relativism being discussed is moral relativism, the kind of which MOST people (in the US) know of as cultural/social moral relativism, a doctrine which almost no one can seriously hold up either epistemological nor otherwise.

My points were towards epistemological bases for moral relativism, of which only one form of absolute relativism is unacceptable, which is the one that sets all moral views as equally true. Myself, I am an absolute relativist since I deny there is a universal conception of "good in itself" that is in any way possible. To say, however, that for human nature as empirically observed and experienced there are better environments and modes of social being, is not really a moral statement, but a mere factual statement which itself has no moral truth. It can, however, be interpreted morally and made as an evaluative statement, but evaluations of this sort are not themselves "truths" in a typical analytic sense (some continentals have alternate theories of truth).

As a scientific functionalist, the truth of such theories lie in their capacity to allow us to enact the changes in the world we desire. As someone that believes developmental psychology is the modern key to an actually useful conception of ethics, I believe that it is in a theory of psychology which can enable us to reduce or remove human stresses at their roots and not their effects by informing social organization and relational structures that can be rightfully claimed as the basis of ethics.

I might have missed your point entirely, I'm tired as fuck right now.

It doesn't really have any flaws, it's pretty relative.

>>560
>Absolute relativism refutes itself because if all points of view are true
Nah:
"All ethical/moral statements lack a rigid, objective truth-value" is a meta-ethical statement itself, it can be true and doesn't refer to itself.