http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2015/Lemieuxgoogle.html
On April 15, 2015, the European Commission (EC), which is the European Union executive, accused Google of "abusing a dominant position… by systematically favouring its own comparison-shopping product in its general search results pages."1 The EC announcement followed five years of threats to, and negotiations with, Google. The EC also announced a formal investigation into the alleged market power that Google gets over companies that use its free Android operating system.2 The French government is also planning an action against Google.
The EC accusation illustrates how antitrust can be used as a protectionist instrument and a coercive tool by less-efficient competitors. More generally, it reveals the poverty of the standard antitrust doctrine, which ignores the fact that the pursuit or maintenance of a dominant market position gives firms a strong incentive to innovate. This doctrine is blind to the fragile and temporary character of any market dominance not protected by government regulation. It downplays the fact that market dominance crucially depends on how one defines the relevant market. The attack against Google ignores the huge value that Google has created by providing services that are essentially free for the individual consumer. And note the irony of the whole confrontation: the European Union, a large non-competitive organization, charges a private company with abusing an uncertain market position.