>>1007
I'm a Brit and that's not what they're negotiating. Nobody here thinks that's what they're negotiating.
Cameron wants token changes to our relationship with the EU. Free Movement would require treaty change and could only be repealed if every member state have assent or if we left the EU on our own. Cameron won't touch the issue and has so far failed to mention it. No change to free movement, no change to the European Arrest Warrant, no change to the Common Fishery's Policy, no change to the Common Agricultural Policy.
>There are two strategic options now open to the Prime Minister. He could go for broke, state that he is prepared to advocate a Brexit if he doesn’t get what he wants, and demand a significant repatriation of powers.
>He could talk up, if only as a threat, the possibility of Britain joining the European Free Trade Association, giving us access to the single market (and forcing us to be bound by its rules) but avoid other EU policies. He could float the possibility of a hybrid, tailor-made solution, and set up a major commission to investigate alternatives.
>This high-stakes course of action – let’s call it the maximum renegotiation strategy – would be aimed at shifting our relationship with the EU and also at realigning British politics. It would rob Ukip of its raison d’être, split the Labour Party and, if executed with skill, allow Mr Cameron to reposition himself as a truly national leader.
>Regardless of the outcome, this would involve a seminal confrontation with British Europhiles and Europe’s governments, something that he may not have the appetite or inclination to do. Mr Cameron has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to surprise; but so far he has shown no signs that he wants to be the Prime Minister who makes a complete break with 50 years of European policy.
>The alternative approach is more cautious: focus on a few easy wins and plan for an early referendum in which Mr Cameron, in alliance with the leaders of all the main parties bar Ukip, can campaign to stay in. This would include some controls on out-of-work benefits (though probably not in-work benefits) for EU migrants, opting out of the principle of ever-closer union, and one or two other gimmicks.
>This second approach – the minimal renegotiation strategy – currently seems more likely. The Government would kick-start the talks in June at the European Council meeting, where the fallout from the Greek crisis will also be on the agenda, before moving on to formal, detailed negotiations in October. This would doubtless end in a blazing row, followed by six weeks of further discussions.
>A deal that would presumably not require a Treaty change could then be announced at the December Council, and a triumphant Mr Cameron would declare victory. He would call on the public to vote Yes; Labour, the Lib Dems and the SNP would follow suit, as would the bulk of big business, with just Ukip calling for a No.
>A referendum would be held in May 2016, timed to coincide with the London, Scottish and local elections: this would maximise the turnout of Yes voters and allow parties to use their local activists to deliver leaflets. In their more unguarded moments, advocates of this strategy predict a crushing Yes that would destroy the sceptics forever.
>There is just one problem: it won’t work. It would be a huge missed opportunity for the UK to regain at least some powers over its own affairs; and it would be fraught with political dangers.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11619602/Be-bold-Prime-Minister-and-you-can-change-the-course-of-history.html
—